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About the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment is a joint center of Columbia Law School and the 
Earth Institute at Columbia University and a leading applied research center and forum for the study, 
practice and discussion of sustainable international investment.  Our mission is to develop and 
disseminate practical approaches and solutions to maximize the impact of international investment 
for sustainable development.  CCSI’s premise is that responsible investment leads to benefits for 
both investors and the residents of host countries.  Through research, advisory projects, multi-
stakeholder dialogue and educational programs, CCSI focuses on constructing and implementing a 
holistic investment framework that promotes sustainable development and the mutual trust needed 
for long-term investments that can be practically adopted by governments, companies and civil 
society. 
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Introduction 
CCSI's work to date on the questions of "shared use" 
Since 2011, the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) has extensively researched how 
mining-related infrastructure can best be leveraged for economic development. A first working paper 
sets out the findings for mineral railways and ports. A second working paper extends the research to 
power infrastructure. Both are available for download from CCSI’s website at: 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/leveraging-infrastructure-investments-for-development/. 
In 2012-2013, CCSI collaborated with the World Bank to systematically assess the potential and 
challenges of power-mining integration in Sub-Saharan Africa. To that end, CCSI built the Africa 
Power-Mining Database in 2013: it contains 455 projects in 28 Sub-Saharan African countries with a 
minimum of US$250 million gross value of ores reserves, in all project phases, spanning the years 
2000-2020. This database estimates the demand for power in 2000, 2012 and 2020 and identifies the 
range of past, present and future power sourcing arrangements for the 455 projects. The study also 
includes an assessment of the different institutional settings and policy instruments that have the 
potential to lead to improved integration between mines' investment plans in power infrastructure 
and governments’ plans for national power development.  
In April 2013, CCSI was awarded a grant from the Australian Government to develop an 
economically, legally and operationally rational framework to enable shared use of mining-related 
infrastructure, including rail, ports, power, water, and internet and telecommunications (ICT). The 
framework was obtained by distilling best practice principles from infrastructure developments 
around the world to guide resource rich African governments in promoting shared use of mining-
related infrastructure. Three in-depth case studies, namely Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique, 
were chosen to apply the findings to country specific circumstances and refine the framework. 
The draft of each infrastructure framework was presented at the “Shared Use of Mining-Related 
Infrastructure” workshop held at Columbia University on November 15, 2013, at which 31 experts 
from academia, development organizations, the private and public sectors provided feedback and 
recommendations.
1
 The feedback has been integrated in the framework accordingly.  
The importance of the question of shared use 
 
The concept of “shared use” or “open access” relates to finding ways to leverage extractive-industry-
related infrastructure investments in developing countries for the broader benefit of the national and 
regional community. According to the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic conducted by the 
World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa faces an annual infrastructure funding gap of US$31 billion.
2
 
Leveraging extractive-industry-related investment could help narrow this gap. Moreover, the 
McKinsey Global institute has come to the conclusion that resource-rich countries have 
infrastructure of a poorer quality than that in non-resource rich countries. The infrastructure gap of 
the next 17 years (until 2030) is believed to be four times higher than that of the past 17 years, and 
10% of the gap relates to developing the mineral resources in these countries (with 7% amenable to 
multi-user- and 3% to multi-purpose infrastructure). 
                                                 
1
 See Annex A for the agenda of the expert workshop and the participant list. 
2
 Established in 2006 for 10 years. 
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To be beneficial for a country’s development, non-renewable resource extraction needs to be 
leveraged to build long-term assets, such as infrastructure, that will support sustainable and inclusive 
growth. This can be achieved, for instance, by capitalizing on the resource taxation potential and 
reinvesting the tax revenues in all-weather roads but it can also be done by requiring shared use of 
the resource infrastructure.  
 
The challenge in relation to achieving shared use lies in the fact that natural resource concessionaires 
have traditionally adopted an enclave approach to infrastructure development, providing their own 
power, water, ICT, and transportation services to ensure that the basic infrastructure needed for their 
operations is reliably available.
3
 Hence, large investments in physical infrastructure are often 
uncoordinated with national infrastructure development plans.  The country therefore misses the 
opportunity to promote shared use of the infrastructure and to take advantage of potential synergies.  
 
Shared use can be considered multi-user where several mining companies in a region use a particular 
infrastructure, or multi-purpose where non-mining users have access to it (for example forestry 
concessionaires sharing mining-related power infrastructure, or passengers being transported along a 
mining-related railway line). Both should be promoted, as the former may lead to economies of scale 
among mining companies thereby reducing the operating costs of the mines and increasing tax 
revenues to the government, and the latter could lower the costs of water supply, energy, 
transportation, and ICT services to other users, which may promote economic development in a 
region.  
 
As the World Bank’s report on Liberia states: “the interface with national infrastructure planning is 
not well developed (…) the contracts do not give the sense of the concessionaires operating within or 
accommodating themselves to a pre-existing national plan.”4 
 
If companies and governments consider the potential of shared use infrastructure through the 
expansion of the private sector’s planned investments at the design phase, the incremental capital 
cost on the economy and the environment could be minimized, while the beneficial impact on 
sustainable development would be optimized. Moreover, shared use can also foster social trust in the 
potential contribution of mining to development.    
 
The potential of leveraging infrastructure investments in extractive industries for national and 
regional development is gaining prevalence among policymakers. The World Bank, the African 
Development Bank and the African Union, along with various other development agencies, have 
endorsed the concept, recognizing that private sector involvement is required to meet the vast 
infrastructure funding gap in developing countries.
5
  
 
 
                                                 
3
 See H. Singer, “The distribution of gains from trade and investment—revisited,” 11(4) Journal of Development Studies 
376 (1975), pp. 376–382. 
4
 World Bank, “Infrastructure Policy Notes: Leveraging investments by natural resource concessionaires,”  (2011). 
5
 See Masuma Farooki, “The infrastructure and commodities interface in Africa: Time for cautious optimism?,” 24 
Journal of International Development  (2012), p. 216. 
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The challenges to successfully implementing the concept of "shared use" 
 
1 - The negotiation package and its trade-offs 
Governments and companies negotiate over the allocation of the economic rent – which is the 
estimate of excess returns over the required return to the investor and, in theory, this rent should be 
allocated to the owner of the resources, the government. In practice, this rent is the object of 
negotiations that will take the form of a package of economic demands on mining companies.  This 
package is made up of fiscal obligations and non-fiscal obligations, such as local content and shared 
use of infrastructure.  
 
Depending on the priorities of the government, it can therefore negotiate higher demands in one 
particular area (such as building its infrastructure at excess capacity and allowing multi-purpose 
access), but if this comes at a significant cost to the company, the government should be prepared to 
be more lenient on another negotiation point (such as, for example, fiscal receipts). This choice will 
depend on whether the government believes that it can use fiscal revenues to create greater social 
welfare than from requiring shared use of the infrastructure.   
 
Within the government, there are likely to be different views on what aspects should be prioritized in 
negotiations with mining companies. The Ministry of Finance is likely to view tax revenues as the 
single most important negotiation point. The Ministry of Industry, on the other hand, more likely to 
be concerned with local content provisions and domestic processing, whereas the Ministry of 
Transport will be looking to negotiate shared use of the mining-related transport infrastructure. Prior 
to entering negotiations all relevant government actors should agree on the negotiation tactics, on the 
key issues that are of importance and on the possible trade-offs and compromise. 
 
If a government wishes to implement shared use of mining-related infrastructure, it needs to assess 
whether requesting shared-use from a mining concessionaire is worth the “price” – that is, the tax 
revenues it would have to forego to incentivize the investor to accommodate such shared use on 
some of its infrastructure. This price will be high if implementing shared use is an expensive 
undertaking, as can be the case with opening up access to railways. The price can also be minimal 
when the business case for shared use is easily made, as with ICT.  
 
Moreover, from a macro-economic perspective, the higher the cost of the infrastructure, the higher 
the need for a substantive demand for the infrastructure developed for public use which is not easily 
achieved in undeveloped economies.  Thus, shared use in the context of expensive infrastructure 
such as rail, ports and power is worth the price of foregone revenues if (1) there are significant 
economies of scale or scope so that the provision of extra capacity is inexpensive and (2) a real 
market for that marginal low-cost capacity exists. If there are substantive economies of scope and 
scale to benefit from, the business case for shared use and its associated savings will be improved by 
economic pressure related to the decrease in commodity prices.  
 
In the opposite case where the business case is not easily made and economies of scale and scope are 
minimal or non-existent, social benefits might be greater if the investor pays a smaller amount to 
ensure cell phone and drinking water capacity to the surrounding communities, and governments 
retain higher tax revenues and takeover rights in relation to the railway lines at the end of the mining 
concession. 
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Negotiating this package is a complex undertaking, particularly in the context of long-term mining 
contracts where circumstances may change over the course of the concession/ lease. Generally, 
governments suffer from a great deal of asymmetry of information in relation to the cost of 
developing and operating such infrastructure, as well as the impact on the projected cash flow of the 
different scenarios.  Given the potential capital expenditure involved in implementing shared use on 
the part of the mining company and the price paid by the government in terms of foregone tax 
revenues and establishing a regulatory authority to enforce the shared use on the mining-related 
infrastructure, governments should prepare a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the negotiation 
package, with external assistance if necessary.   This negotiation should be framed in the context of a 
broader planning effort for infrastructure expansion and public-private coordination.  Adjusting the 
requests for shared use to the level of present and future demand, as well as profitability of the 
project, is even more important in times of falling commodity prices.  
2- The competitive nature of the mining business  
The competitive nature of large mining companies should not be underestimated. Even if rational 
economic decision-making would suggest shared investment and multi-use of a particular 
infrastructure project, rival mining companies may be unwilling to do so without strong regulatory 
requirements and clear policy guidelines. This may due to several reasons: (i) large multinational 
mining companies compete to supply different grades of ore to their consumers. If a second mining 
company offers a product with similar characteristics, which is likely to be the case of nearby 
concessions (candidate for sharing the same infrastructure) the first mining company can lose its 
competitive advantage in the market; (ii) negotiation outcomes may be a result of corporate level 
strategies rather than project specific discussions when multinational companies are involved in 
several locations; (iii) mining companies can use their monopoly power on the infrastructure in the 
region to acquire further regional concessions at a lower price if these are not viable without 
infrastructure access; (iv) large-scale mining projects can have an impact on market prices. It may 
therefore be in the interest of the leading mining company to restrict regional production to receive 
higher prices for its product.  
 
3 - The strategic quality of mining-related infrastructure assets 
Two factors will determine the willingness of mining companies to share/ open up access to their 
infrastructure: 
 
1. The more costly and strategic the infrastructure, the less willing mining companies will be to 
sharing it. In relation to the infrastructure types examined, this means that mining companies 
are more likely to accept sharing internet and telecommunications (ICT) infrastructure, 
followed by water and then power. Rail and port infrastructure are considered to be the least 
amenable investments to shared-use models, given the vertically integrated logistic chain 
from mine-to-rail-to-port operations. 
2. The higher the potential of economic development associated with multi-purpose access to 
infrastructure, the more inclined mining companies will be to cooperate to save their social 
license to operate. For instance, a community perception that a mining company’s operations 
are consuming available water resources, or contaminating/altering the flow of underground, 
or surface waters can lead to social unrest and operational disruptions. In such a scenario, a 
mining company is more likely to consider increasing the quantity of clean water available to 
the community. 
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The recent fall in commodity prices and declining profit margins in the mining sector could also 
incentivize mining companies to consider share infrastructure among each other to minimize 
costs. 
 
4 - The dilemma of implementing shared use 
If a government is determined to implement shared use, ownership of the infrastructure concession 
becomes a decisive factor.  
 
On the one hand, the government could incentivize shared use of mining-related infrastructure by 
requiring a separation of ownership between the mine and the infrastructure concession. A third 
party would therefore be required to operate the infrastructure, often with the mine as the anchor 
project, but with the objective to maximize its profit and therefore design and operate the 
infrastructure at maximum capacity – an objective that should lead naturally to shared use.  It 
however means that the infrastructure is a profit center for the infrastructure operator and in the 
absence of competition, the infrastructure services are likely to be expensive – a feature that can be 
worsened in the context of politically risky environments where there are no sovereign risk 
guarantees.   
 
On the other hand, user-concessions (whereby the miner-user also owns the infrastructure) allow for 
lower hurdle rates in politically risky and low demand environments and make the infrastructure a 
cost center, which results in an infrastructure project being less costly for both the owners and users. 
Of course in this context, user-concessions bear the danger of the mine exerting its monopoly power 
and thus a strong regulatory system is needed to guarantee shared use and ensure that the 
infrastructure is designed with additional capacity to accommodate such shared use.   
 
In short the dilemma can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. Separation of ownership between the mine and the infrastructure: reduced risk of 
monopoly, higher price of access to the infrastructure for the anchor project. 
2. Integration of ownership between the mine and the infrastructure: higher risk of 
monopoly and difficult to regulate, lower price of access to the infrastructure for the anchor 
project. 
To contain the price of access in alternative 1, it is advised to design a third party entity that can be 
financed by the mine or by an off-take agreement with the mine but with the government or a non-
profit entity managing the infrastructure (the management can in turn be outsourced to a third party).  
 
To contain the monopoly power in alternative 2, it is typically recommended to have a well 
functioning and independent regulatory system. Less commonly recommended but highly suggested 
is that, in the context of railway lines, pipelines, power lines, and fiber optics, the government retains 
the right of way (or servitude) to the underlying land in order to create a corridor of infrastructure, 
leveraging economies of scope.  
 
Moreover, irrespective of a successful implementation of shared use under alternatives 1 or 2, all 
user-concessions should at a minimum contain an option to be granted on a Build–Operate–Transfer 
(BOT) basis so that, after a contractual period of 15-30 years, the infrastructure is transferred back to 
the host government. At the end of this term, other industrial and non-industrial demands would have 
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finally materialized, and the government will be able to make the project attractive for bidding by 
third-party infrastructure concessionaires. Finally, all mining companies should be required to bid on 
infrastructure plans in addition to the typical bidding criteria for a mine. 
 
5 - The objective of this framework and its audience 
Given the complexity of the issue highlighted above, CCSI has developed a framework, distilling 
best practice principles from infrastructure developments around the world.  
 
The framework, presented here, aims to provide guidance to policy makers on how to approach the 
question of shared use, highlighting the operational models that are necessary for implementation, 
the key success factors, the enabling conditions, and considerations on how to ultimately better 
coordinate major investments in physical infrastructure by privately-owned natural resource 
concessionaires with national infrastructure development plans.  The framework will also equip 
policy makers with a set of questions that should help conduct the negotiations on shared use with 
companies. The goal of the framework is to include shared infrastructure use as part of the planning 
and negotiation stages of extractive industry investments.  
 
The framework aims to support the governments of resource-rich countries that suffer from an 
infrastructure gap and have the opportunity to implement shared use on mining-related infrastructure. 
It can also help civil society understand the policy-making trade-offs of shared use and inform 
mining companies of their role to support sustainable development in the host countries. 
 
6 - The scope of the framework 
As seen above, the frameworks cover five types of infrastructure, namely railway lines and ports 
(dealt with together as logistics infrastructure), power, water, and ICT. These infrastructure types are 
considered to embody the greatest potential to fill the infrastructure gap, even though they pose 
significant shared use implementation challenges. In the context of railway lines, we also consider 
road infrastructure as a valuable alternative. The frameworks are presented in order from the most 
challenging infrastructure type to achieve shared use (railway lines and ports) to the least challenging 
type (ICT). 
 
The frameworks have been informed by the African infrastructure context, both in terms of resource 
wealth and the infrastructure gaps, but also draw on lessons learned from other continents.  The 
frameworks target large-scale mining investments. 
 
Each framework sets out the steps that need to be considered by governments in order to plan for and 
negotiate shared use.  
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Given the potentially large net costs associated with the implementation of shared use in the 
context of rails and port infrastructure, the rail and port framework includes a cost-benefit 
analysis as step 2. The frameworks of the other infrastructure types highlight that some 
shared-use projects in which the economies of scale and scope are potentially limited will also 
require a cost-benefit analysis on a case-by-case basis. 
 
7- The key definitions to understand  
Brownfield versus Greenfield investments: a brownfield investment is an investment in existing 
infrastructure, whereas a greenfield investment leads to the construction of new infrastructure asset 
 
Different mining players: the mining industry is not uniform and is composed of junior mines and 
senior mines with the junior ones, mostly private companies, being the risk-seekers mainly interested 
in reselling their license to the more established mines. 
 
Economies of Scale: the economies that occur when the cost per unit of output diminishes with 
increasing scale of the project as fixed costs are spread out over more units of production. 
 
Economies of Scope: in the context of a mining operation, such economies of scope arise when the 
outputs of one type of infrastructure can be used as the inputs of another type of infrastructure. 
 
Infrastructure assets: the physical infrastructure - for instance the railway lines connecting the mine 
to the coastal loading point for export, ICT infrastructure, power plants and their associated 
transmission lines, and waste water treatment plants and distribution lines. 
 
Infrastructure services: the service delivered by the infrastructure asset- for instance the rail freight 
carriage and/or ship loading/unloading using the infrastructure assets. 
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Mine Investor: This is the party wishing to make the new mine development. 
 
Multi-purpose infrastructure: an arrangement where the infrastructure asset is shared between 
different uses with different characteristics (for example farmers and miners). 
Multi-user infrastructure:  an arrangement where the infrastructure asset is shared between 
different users with similar characteristics (for example bulk miners). 
 
PPP or public private partnership: a term used to describe a long term agreement between a 
government entity and a private company, under which the private company provides, or contributes 
to the provision of a public service, such as the construction and/ or operation of an infrastructure 
asset, in exchange of a revenue stream generated by a government budget allocation, user fees, or a 
combination of the two.  
 
Right of way / Servitude: a type of easement granted, or reserved over the land for transportation 
purposes. 
 
Shared use: the provision of infrastructure services to both the mining investor and other parties. 
These other parties can be either mineral users or non- mineral users. 
 
Special purpose vehicle (SPV): a separate legal entity created to fulfill a narrow, specific, or 
temporary objective. SPVs are typically created by companies engaging in major infrastructure 
projects to ring fence the infrastructure assets from the assets of the company. 
 
Third party access: the provision of infrastructure services by a party other than the owner of the 
infrastructure asset.
6
  
 
 
Each infrastructure type will have its own additional concepts that will be defined in each specific 
section. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The user of the services being then either the services provider or a customer of the services provider. 
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Framework 1 
Shared Use of Rail and Port Infrastructure 
 
 
Introduction 
Increasing world demand for mineral resources has created renewed interest in mineral deposits that 
were previously perceived as too risky, or insufficiently profitable to warrant investment. The high-
grade iron ore deposits in Western and Central Africa, and the large-scale coking coal deposits in 
Eastern Africa need major rail and port infrastructure investments to transport the ore from mine to 
market and make these projects viable. With the limited financial capacity of host governments, 
mining investors are expected to fund the infrastructure, which can be as much as three times more 
expensive than the costs associated with the development of the mining project itself. For the 
investor willing to pay for the transport infrastructure (henceforth the “leading mining company”), 
the incentive is to build rail and port capacity that will maximize its profits, is in line with its project 
implementation timeline and results in a competitive advantage over other potential mining 
companies in the region (henceforth the “subsequent mining companies”). Profit maximization can 
provide a sufficient incentive for industry participants to reach a commercial agreement for 
expediting shared investment and shared use. However, the competitive nature of the industry and 
uncoordinated timelines of mining projects may result in an enclave model whereby the leading 
mining company designs, builds and uses the rail and port infrastructure exclusively for its own 
project. From a welfare perspective this can lead to a sub-optimal outcome if other potential users 
that are willing to pay
7
 for the infrastructure and services are denied access. The economies of scale 
of rail and port infrastructure provide scope for additional capacity at a reduced cost. The 
incremental cost for additional capacity is significantly lower than the construction of a separate 
railway line and port facility. The right-of-way associated with railway lines, also provide significant 
opportunities for economies of scope for other types of infrastructure to be integrated or built next to 
the rail tracks. 
 
The government has a key role to play to correct the market failure when it arises, and this section 
addresses the necessary steps that need to be considered to promote shared use in rail and port 
infrastructure. Port and rail infrastructure have been combined, as the capacity of these two 
infrastructure developments needs to be designed in parallel to provide a viable logistics solution for 
the mining projects. Furthermore, there are cross-cutting regulatory and operational multi-user and 
multi-purpose issues that are relevant for both infrastructure investments. Unless specified, the 
regulatory and operational frameworks therefore apply to both rail and port infrastructure.  
                                                 
7
 This willingness to pay might be based on subsidized access to the infrastructure for non-miners. 
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Key Definitions 
 
Above rail: Rolling stock and rolling stock related infrastructure such as maintenance yards and train 
stations.  
Below rail: Track facilities, including rail, sleepers, ballast, platforms, tunnels and bridges. 
Options analysis: Comparison of benefits and costs of different rail and port investment options. 
Port infrastructure: Infrastructure used by all types of vessels, such as access channel, dredged port 
basin and breakwater. 
Port superstructure: Infrastructure used for a particular cargo type, including terminals, storage 
facilities, stackers and reclaimers. 
Dry port: Inland terminal that is connected to rail and/or road infrastructure where cargos are 
consolidated and stored, and where custom clearance services can be provided. 
Leading Mining Company: Large-scale mining company that is the first mover in the region and 
has the financial backing to build rail and port infrastructure to transport the cargo from mine to 
market. 
Subsequent Mining Company: Mining companies that invest in the region following the leading 
mining company. 
 
Step 1: Assessing the current situation - What is at stake? 
Prior to deciding on the importance of open access for a particular railway line and/or port facility, a 
government should understand how the mining and infrastructure projects align with the country’s 
long-term objectives and priorities. It will also need to understand the number of players and 
interests involved, as well as the importance of timing of the shared use discussions.  
 
a) Putting the infrastructure project into perspective 
The government should first determine the strategic importance of the railway and port infrastructure 
by assessing how the proposed developments align with national and regional infrastructure plans. 
For this purpose, the government needs to assess the potential future demand for the infrastructure in 
question. If, for example, the leading mining company is proposing to build an integrated railway 
line and port facility that runs through a deserted and sparsely populated region with no or little 
prospects for future mining projects and/or other economic projects that could benefit from the 
infrastructure, the weight associated to the benefits of open access is much lower than if the corridor 
connects a resource-rich region where several mining companies are developing heavy ore or coal 
mining projects and/or the railway runs through an unconnected and highly fertile region where 
agriculture projects are likely to be developed as a result of access to rail and port services. For this 
analysis it is important to bear in mind that only a limited amount of goods are suitable for rail 
transport. These tend to be high-volume and non-perishable. The vast majority of rail transport in the 
world is made up by coal & coke, other high volume and low cost minerals, iron & steel, oil & 
petroleum, cement, chemicals, lumber, fertilizers, cereals & grains and soybeans.
8
 Furthermore, 
transport distance plays an important role. Short distances are better suited for road transport, but as 
distances increase, railway transportation becomes more attractive. In West Africa the World Bank 
                                                 
8
 World Bank, “Freight Transport for Development Toolkit: Rail Freight,” (2009), available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTRAILWAYS/Resources/515244-1268663980770/rail_freight.pdf. 
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found that “railways still offer the most economical solution to transporting non-time sensitive bulk 
freight on distances over 500km.”9  
 
The potential demand for multi-use/ multi-purpose infrastructure will closely relate to the 
infrastructure already in place. Competition in the railway sector could come from alternative 
railway systems or the road sector. For ports, the potential demand largely depends on the services 
that nearby ports offer. If, for example, the leading mining company proposes to build a dedicated 
finger tip terminal nearby an existing multi-user/multi-purpose port with potential to expand, it may 
not be cost effective to impose multi-purpose access to such port and build the necessary 
infrastructure, but rather expand the existing port.  
 
The infrastructure in place will also determine the competitiveness of the access tariffs. A large rail 
and port network will provide users with alternative transport route options. If the operator increases 
the tariffs, users can choose an alternative route (provided that this route is not managed by the same 
operator). If, however, only a single railway line connects two regions, there is no pressure by the 
rail operator to keep transit tariffs low. Competition from the road sector will depend on the quality 
of the road network and the competitiveness among road haulage companies. Government subsidies 
for diesel are further going to increase the competitiveness of road haulage. 
 
b) Understanding the Players/Interests 
Various players have opposing interests in open access discussions, which make negotiations 
complicated. The government needs to map out each player’s interests and play a mediating role to 
achieve the best possible outcome from an economic welfare perspective. The likely players and 
interests can be summarized as follows: 
 
Potential Players Involved in Open Access Negotiations 
 
 
                                                 
9
 World Bank, Review of Selected Railway Concessions in Sub-Saharan Africa (2006), available at: available at: 
http://www4.worldbank.org/afr/ssatp/Resources/WorldBank-WorkingPapers/ESW-RailwayConcessions.pdf. 
Government 
Leading 
Mining 
Company 
Subsequent 
Mining 
Companies 
Third Party 
Users 
Financiers 
Neighboring 
Country 
Government 
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 Government 
The government’s aim is to maximize the benefits of the extraction of its resources. However, as set 
out in the introduction, different ministries within the government are likely to have varied views on 
how to achieve this. While the Ministry of Finance may want to maximize tax revenues and hence 
prefer the integrated logistics solution, the Ministry of Transport is likely to pursue multi-user and 
multi-purpose access to achieve its mandate of improved transport infrastructure access for the 
country. Prior engaging in the negotiations with the mining company, the government should agree 
on the importance that is placed on the open access discussions.  
 
 Leading Mining Company 
The leading mining company’s objective is to maximize the profits of its operations. If rail and port 
infrastructure with sufficient capacity exist, the company will aim to access this infrastructure at the 
best possible access charges and tariff rates under a long-term take or pay agreement, which 
guarantees that it is allocated sufficient capacity for its mining operations. If there is a lack of 
infrastructure in place and the mine site is profitable enough to warrant the infrastructure investment, 
the leading mining company is likely to build the infrastructure. It will optimize the design of the 
railway line and port terminal in line with the mining operation and will manage the operations under 
a vertically integrated model. 
 
There may be scope for shared infrastructure investments with another mining company if this does 
not interfere with its own operations and if there is no competitive rivalry between the two investors. 
The competitive nature of large mining companies should not be underestimated as explained in the 
introduction of the framework. This is especially the case for transport infrastructure. If the leading 
mining company is successful at denying other miners access to the rail and port infrastructure and 
the alternative logistics solution is significantly more expensive or not viable, the value of the nearby 
concessions are going to fall. This may allow the leading mining company to acquire these 
concessions at a lower price than they would have had to pay if there were a logistics solution in 
place.  
 
 Subsequent Mining Companies 
Subsequent mining companies can be divided into large-scale players that have the financial capacity 
to invest in alternative infrastructure of their own to make a mining project viable, and smaller 
(“junior”) mining companies that do not have the financial means for such investments. The smaller 
mining companies will want the infrastructure to be built at excess capacity to ensure that they can 
use the infrastructure when needed. Depending on the financial resources of the mining company in 
question and timeframe of the project, some may be interested in gaining an equity share in the 
infrastructure investment if this guarantees them capacity on the railway line and port terminal. 
Mining companies without the resources to acquire an equity share in the project will look to pay 
user fees once the investment is completed. To reduce the power of the leading mining company in 
the operation of the infrastructure, subsequent mining companies prefer a third party managing the 
rail and port operations.  
 
A subsequent large-scale player may be interested in sharing the infrastructure investment or 
building its own logistics solution. Depending on the route of the proposed alternative transport 
corridor, the government will need to assess whether it should push for a shared infrastructure 
solution or multiple corridors. A single solution may benefit the government in terms of revenues 
from the combined mining projects, due to the economies of scale associated with the construction of 
one high volume railway line and port terminal as opposed to two with lower capacities. However, 
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the alternative logistics solution may reduce the countries’ dependence of one export corridor in case 
bottlenecks arise, and/or the potential for broader economic development along both corridors if 
these are open access.  
 
 Third party users 
Third party users are the benefactors of multi-purpose access. In the African context, these are likely 
to be large-scale agriculture and forestry projects, and passengers. These do not have the financial 
resources to invest in rail and port infrastructure and rely on existing infrastructure and rolling stock. 
Passenger services, especially in developing countries, tend to be subsidized. These services do not 
generate sufficient revenues to cover the average costs of rail and port infrastructure and often do not 
even cover the marginal cost of these services. Hence these players rely on strong government 
intervention and cross-subsidization.  
 
 Financiers 
In the African context, it is unlikely that project finance from external lenders is going to be above 
50% for large infrastructure projects.
10
 Financiers will assess the profitability of a project and the 
likelihood that the loan will be repaid in time. For this, the financiers will look at the project sponsor, 
the project economics, the risk allocation and mitigation, the performance standards on social and 
environmental sustainability and the other project parties that are involved in the project. The riskier 
the project, the higher the lending rates. At a certain threshold, financiers will not provide loans. 
Financiers prefer the leading mining vertically integrated rail and port infrastructure model, as it 
provides the most predictability. The second preferred option is where the leading mining company 
and subsequent mining companies have agreed to co-finance and use the rail and port infrastructure.  
 
It becomes riskier when non-mining players are granted access to the infrastructure, as these do not 
have the same financial backing as the mining companies do, and because a multi-purpose operated 
railway line becomes more complicated with lower efficiency levels (and hence reduced profits to 
repay the loan). Risk is significantly higher when the users of the infrastructure are unknown at the 
point of financial close. Long-term take or pay commitments by the mining companies will provide 
some certainty over future incomes. If, however, excess capacity is built without knowing who will 
be using it, the danger exists that the demand might never materialize, thereby harming the returns on 
the investment. The worst possible scenario to raise finance for an infrastructure project is a multi-
user and multi-purpose infrastructure project with unallocated capacity at the financial close. 
 
 Neighbouring country government (in case of cross-border infrastructure)  
Neighboring governments will seek access to the infrastructure in order to grant the right-of-way. To 
maximize the potential impact on its economy, it will push for multi-user and multi-purpose access. 
Transit fees are also likely to be charged. 
 
c) The Importance of Timing 
The timing of open access negotiations is crucial. If the leading mining company knows well in 
advance that it will need to provide open access on its infrastructure investments, it can take these 
aspects into consideration during the feasibility studies and project design phase. It is preferable to 
                                                 
10
 IFC, “Fostering the Development of Greenfield Mining-Related Transport Infrastructure Through Project Financing” 
(April 2013), available at: 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/c019bf004f4c6ebfbd99ff032730e94e/Mine+Infra+Report+Final+Copy.pdf?MOD=
AJPERES. 
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negotiate open access in parallel with the remaining mining specific negotiations, as the investor will 
take all aspects into account when running its financial model that will contribute in the decision 
making process of whether to move ahead with a particular project.  
 
Imposing open access requirements later on in the negotiations when key terms of the project have 
already been agreed on could harm the relationship between the government and the leading mining 
company, especially if the leading mining company has been expecting sole use of its developed 
infrastructure. This can have a negative impact on the perceived long-term political risk environment 
of the country. Upon completion of the construction of the railway line and port facilities it is most 
difficult to negotiate and impose open access, especially if the infrastructure is operating at full 
capacity. 
 
Setting a precedent for open access negotiations is also of importance. If the leading mining 
company is allowed to build, own and manage a fully integrated single user transport system without 
any regulatory framework in place to allow for future discussions on open access, it will be difficult 
for the government to impose an open access regime on a second large scale mining operation that 
also requires its own rail and port operations. The general trend has shifted from allowing mining 
companies to build exclusive infrastructure projects to requiring open access. The Australian 
government is increasingly pushing for multi-user access in the Pilbara and African governments are 
increasingly following the recommendations of the African Mining Vision report, which highlights 
the importance of leveraging mining infrastructure for broader economic development.
11
 
 
 
Step 2: Cost -benefit analysis 
A detailed cost benefit analysis is necessary for the government to decide on the importance of 
negotiating open access in a particular mining related rail and port project.  
 
a) Potential benefits of shared use 
 
 Lower capital and operating costs for miners 
The realization of synergies and economies of scale decreases the transport unit cost. This in turn 
will increase profit margins of the companies, thereby resulting in higher tax revenues to the 
government. 
 Development of otherwise “stranded assets 
Enabling access to mining companies can facilitate the development of smaller, otherwise stranded 
mining concessions. The development of these assets will result in additional tax revenues, 
employment opportunities and linkages to the economy. 
 
 Non-mining development along the corridor 
With multi-purpose access to the rail and port infrastructure, projects in other sectors may become 
economically attractive. These could include large-scale agriculture, forestry and industrial projects. 
With cheaper transportation options available, existing projects are also likely to expand and increase 
production. This, in turn, will generate additional tax revenues and employment opportunities.  
                                                 
11
 Glen Ireland, “Mining Infra – Case for a New Approach,” in Project Finance International Middle East & Africa 
Special Report, Latham Watkins, September 2013, available at: http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/new-approach-
african-mining-infrastructure. 
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 Back-haulage opportunities 
The return journey wagons of a mineral exporting railway line are typically empty and there may be 
scope to use this capacity for imports.
 
The shipping costs are also going to decrease significantly if 
vessels carry cargo on both legs of the journey. However, back-haulage opportunities are limited to 
goods that can be carried in bulk cargo vessels and in open top hopper or gondola car wagons. An 
example of such synergies could be inland transportation of fertilizers.
12
 
 
 Regional integration 
With open access, cross border infrastructure projects servicing mining companies are going to 
increase trade opportunities with neighboring countries. Apart from the potential economic benefits 
of such trade, cooperation will lead to regional integration and reduced risk of political confrontation 
in the future. Furthermore, economies of scale can be achieved if infrastructure planning is made at 
the regional rather than at the national level.  
 
b) Potential costs and risks of shared use 
 
 Capital expenditure (assuming excess capacity availability)  
The additional infrastructure and rolling stock costs associated with third party access on a railway 
line will largely depend on the commodity that the third party wants to transport. If it is a commodity 
with similar characteristics, the additional costs are limited to investments in a new railway spur to 
the mine site with loading facilities and additional rolling stock (locomotives and wagons). Higher 
incremental costs are associated with multi-purpose third party access. Additional railway spurs and 
specialized loading and offloading facilities will be needed to accommodate alternative goods such 
as forestry and/or agriculture products being transported on the lines. Disbursed general cargo 
projects may require dry ports where trains are assembled to guarantee sufficient cargo volumes for 
rail transport to be economically feasible. Furthermore, train wagons might also not be 
interchangeably used for mineral and the general cargo transportation.  
 
Passenger services on freight lines represent a further cost, as safety standards need to be higher and 
stations need to be built that are separate from the freight loading and unloading facilities. Passenger 
services are also likely to stop at regular intervals and travel at higher speeds than the heavy haul 
railways. This makes management more complicated and can lead to a reduction of the overall 
capacity of the railway line. 
 
At the port, no additional investments are needed if there is excess capacity and another mining 
company is allowed access to the terminal exporting the same commodity. The capital costs 
associated with multi-purpose access will largely depend on the terminal and its handling equipment.  
If the terminal is setup as a general cargo type terminal,
13
 other commodities could be handled if 
there is a clear separation that guarantees non-contamination.
14
 However, large-scale iron-ore and 
coal terminals will have specific loading superstructure in place with stackers, reclaimers and 
                                                 
12
 In practice back-haulage opportunities have not materialized, as mining companies that generally own the rolling 
stock, are not inclined to carry third party cargo. However, in Liberia there are discussions of transporting coal inland to 
supply the proposed JSPL thermal power plant, on the return leg of the trains servicing the iron-ore mines.  
13
 In Beira port, for example, JSPL and Beacon Hill are currently exporting via the general cargo terminal with a truck 
and skip system. 
14
 This is of particular importance when food commodities are handled at the same terminal as minerals as coal dust, for 
example, can contaminate the food. 
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conveyor belt systems reducing vessel-loading time. At such terminal, it is not possible to handle 
other types of commodities. For multi-purpose access in such situation, the construction of separate 
terminals will be required. Associated costs may include dredging to expand the basin, building 
berths, storage facilities and investing in new handling equipment. In extreme cases, the provision 
for multi-purpose access for a proposed greenfield port may require a completely different design of 
the port infrastructure with significant additional costs.  
 
 Costs associated with increasing the capacity 
Rail capacity is not a rigid, linear concept. If well-managed, occasional passenger and general cargo 
trains could run in between the larger mineral trains without disrupting the schedule or service. In 
such cases, capacity access may not pose additional costs (if the necessary rolling stock and 
infrastructure for these alternative services is in place). If the port in question has general cargo and 
passenger terminals, a small increase in port throughput is also not going to intervene with the 
mining operations.  
 
Significant third party access allocation, on the other hand, will demand further infrastructure 
investments. On the railway line, costs could include increasing the number of loops and sidings, 
reinforcing the tracks and bridges and/or expanding the railway line to a double track system. At the 
port, increased capacity might be associated with the terminal expansion and the construction of 
additional terminals. This may also demand general port infrastructure investments such as dredging 
the port access channel in order to be able to handle larger vessels.  
 
 Efficiency loss 
Operating one vertically integrated customer from mine to rail to port to ship is easier than if several 
users need to be accommodated. For the Goonyella mine associated infrastructure, for example, 
O’Donnel estimates that operational efficiency of a multi-user rail and port system would be 10-20% 
below a single-user model.
15
 This efficiency loss is further increased when multi-purpose goods are 
granted access to the railway line. Passenger services, for example, generally travel at different 
speeds and stop at regular intervals. This multi-purpose efficiency loss is not necessarily observed at 
ports, as other commodities and passenger services will not be anchoring at the mineral terminal.  
 
 Access to Finance 
As outlined in the “Understanding the player/interests” section, it will be easier to access finance 
under the single-user model. Multi-user and multi-purpose access increases the difficulty to obtain 
financing, especially if the end-users are unknown at the point of financial close.  
 
 Delay of Negotiations 
The additional commercial complexity in negotiating with multiple users, and the additional 
technical design needed to accommodate more users risks delaying the project schedule.
16
 This, in 
turn, will delay government revenues from the leading mining company and could ultimately result 
in the cancellation of the project.  
 
 Costs of regulatory body to supervise shared use 
                                                 
15
 Stephen O’Donnel,”Goonyella Coal Chain Capacity Review - letter,” July 29, 2007, available at: 
http://www.tmr.qld.gov.au/business-industry/Transport-sectors/Rail-services-and-infrastructure/Goonyella-Coal-Chain-
Capacity-Review.aspx 
16
 Each additional major negotiating party will increase negotiation complexity.  
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Any government mandate for shared use beyond a mere facilitation role requires a regulatory body 
with an adequate operating budget. The box below outlines the tasks and characteristics of such 
regulatory body. The more interventionist the regulating body, the more important it is that it 
functions properly and is well funded. 
 
Regulatory Body Tasks 
Regulate tariffs: The operator needs to charge sufficiently high fees to recoup the investment, cover 
operational and maintenance costs, and make a reasonable profit margin. However, the operator 
should not benefit from excessive profits as a result of its monopoly power. A reference tariff could 
be published by the operator, which serves as a baseline for negotiations with users. After agreeing to 
the reference tariff, the regulatory body could impose margins, above and below which the operator 
cannot negotiate. The mechanisms and standards to calculate the reference tariff should be objective 
and transparent.  
Guarantee non-discrimination: The leading mining company and financiers/guarantors of the 
infrastructure development will require priority access on a pre-agreed amount of capacity. However,  
there should be a level playing field as to how this capacity is allocated, be it among the existing 
infrastructure users or new entrants. Clear access conditions need to be established and adhered to, 
and the regulator will need to define the information that must be made available by the operator. 
Furthermore, transparent arbitration mechanisms should be established to ensure enforcement of the 
access allocations and to regulate disputes. The infrastructure operator and access seeker need to be 
aware of the procedures and guaranteed equal treatment in arbitrations. 
Define access charges: In case there is a separation of the infrastructure operator from the 
infrastructure owner, the latter will require access charges for the use of its infrastructure (and in turn 
the infrastructure operator will charge tariffs to the end user). The calculation of access charges can 
be divided into marginal cost pricing, which covers the maintenance costs associated with the 
service, and average cost pricing, which also includes the original construction costs of the 
infrastructure. The regulatory body may impose different calculation methodologies for different 
services. 
Guarantee infrastructure investments: The regulator should be able to require capacity expansion 
if there is sufficient contracted demand. The tariff and access charges should reflect such additional 
investments. 
Standards: The regulatory body should ensure that the safety, environmental and technical 
regulations are adhered to by all rail users and owners of infrastructure. 
Characteristics of regulator 
Information asymmetry: The owner and operator of the rail and port infrastructure have a better 
understanding of the costs involved. These are not easily auditable. Therefore significant expertise 
and experience is necessary within the regulatory body to monitor tariffs and access charges. 
Governments that do not have the expertise should seek foreign expertise until the necessary capacity 
is built up.  
Independence: The regulatory body should be independent from the government, mining companies 
and operators to guarantee neutrality and a fair judgment. Where such independence is not present, a 
transitional regulatory system is needed, which might have to rely on the juridical system and/or an 
international dispute settlement board. The level of intervention of the regulator should be 
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proportional to its maturity and independence. 
Clear decision-making process: To guarantee independent, consistent rulings in disputes, and to 
gain the trust of the private sector, clear technical guidelines should be outlined upon which 
decisions are made. 
 
c) Options analysis 
If several rail and port options are discussed, the government should make a cost-benefit analysis for 
each option. This options analysis should also include the possibility of investments in infrastructure 
that is unrelated to the mining project (for example, it might be more cost effective for the 
government to capitalize on higher tax revenues from the mining project and invest in a road 
alongside the railway track, or expand an existing multi-purpose port rather than insisting on the 
construction of a separate terminal at a proposed greenfield mineral port). The government should 
always keep in mind the impact that different routes and open access requests will have on the 
logistics costs for the leading mining company. Above a certain threshold the mining project itself 
might become unviable.  
 
Step 3: Identifying operational synergies and verifying the necessary 
preconditions for shared use 
There is no “one-size fits all” operational model for port and rail infrastructure. The strategic 
importance of the infrastructure projects in question will define the government’s initial stance on 
multi-user and multi-purpose access. By understanding the interests at play, the government will be 
able to gauge what the likelihood is that open access is achieved without significant intervention.  
The figure below sets out a number of different scenarios that may arise from the above analysis. The 
red arrow indicates that with increasing benefits associated with open access and a larger number of 
players involved in the open access discussions, there is an increasingly important role for the 
government to play and intervene, as the market is unlikely to provide the socially optimal outcome.  
 
Government intervention depends on the benefits/costs associated with open access 
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The remaining section will discuss each scenario and propose design and operational models, as well 
as the necessary regulatory framework and level of intervention that might be best suited for each to 
guarantee open access and non-discrimination.  
 
1. Little foreseen economic benefit from open access 
 
 Design and Operational Model 
Such a scenario would result from no other present or future economically feasible mining projects 
being located in the region (even if these had access to rail and port services), little potential for 
projects along the corridor that could benefit from multi-purpose access, and the corridor being 
located in a sparsely populated area, thereby not generating potential use for trade or a passenger 
service. The economic benefit of imposing open access could also be limited if existing nearby rail 
and port infrastructure already provide multi-user and/or multi-purpose services and there is scope to 
increase capacity on this alternative infrastructure at a lower cost.  
In such case it is best to let the leading mining company finance, own and manage the vertically 
integrated rail and port infrastructure to maximize efficiency along the corridor. The mining 
company may choose to operate the infrastructure facilities itself or contract a service provider for 
these purposes. The leading mining company will design and manage the rail and port infrastructure 
to maximize profits of its mining operation, which in turn will lead to higher corporate taxes being 
paid to the government.  
 
 Regulatory Framework and Level of Intervention 
Since there is little value added by imposing open access or insist on increased capacity on such 
infrastructure project and/or monitor the access and transport tariffs in the foreseeable future, the 
government should not intervene. 
 
Instead, the government should focus on regulatory provisions that would allow for 
renegotiations in case there is access demand for the infrastructure in the future. Blanket open 
access regimes such as the one in Australia, encompass all sectors of the economy, but are only 
likely to be applied in key sectors that are of strategic significance and where monopolistic behavior 
and abuse of market power is likely to occur (such as in port and railway services). The regime sets 
out the conditions under which the government will consider breach to open access. Conditions in 
Australia include that (1) it is not economically feasible to duplicate the infrastructure in question, 
(2) access to the infrastructure in question is necessary to permit effective competition, (3) the 
infrastructure in question is of strategic national importance to the national economy, (4) the 
infrastructure in question can be used by the third party at an economically feasible cost without 
increasing health and safety risks, and (5) access is not already subject to an effective regime. Similar 
conditions can be included in industry specific access regimes, which are tailored for a particular 
sector. Such regulation should not only apply to competing companies (as is the case in the USA), 
but also to other sectors of the economy that might benefit from access to the infrastructure (as is the 
case in Australia). If the third party can prove the conditions set out in the access regime, the 
government can act as a negotiating facilitator between the infrastructure owner/operator and the 
third party. If these negotiations do not result in agreement, the government should be able to 
intervene to guarantee access under reasonable tariffs.  
 
Blanket or industry specific regulatory regimes need to be clearly drafted on objective criteria in 
order to be effective. In the case of Australia, the “not economically feasible” creates room for 
interpretation and also imposes an unnecessary burden. If increasing the capacity on an existing 
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railway line or port terminal to guarantee multi-user access is less costly than building a separate 
line/terminal, this should be sufficient to impose multi-user access, even if it is economically feasible 
to build a second line/terminal. Furthermore, these regulations should not be softened or contradicted 
in the contract with the leading mining company. In the case of Australia, Rio Tinto has been able to 
deny third party access in Pilbara,
17
 because it argued that third party access would prejudice or 
interfere with its operations, which was a clause included in its contract.  
 
If the leading mining company also concludes that there is no economic benefit from open access 
and therefore little risk of a third party aiming to acquire access to the infrastructure in the 
foreseeable future, it should not be deterred by such regulation. If, however, the company does voice 
concerns about the regulation, the government could include an “access holiday” clause with an 
expiration date in the contract (also known as a sunset clause). Such clauses guarantee that the 
infrastructure in question is not subject to any access regulation during an agreed timeframe. Both 
the Camrail and Sitarail concessions in West Africa contain such clauses for five and seven years 
respectively.
18
 The inclusion of such a clause could also be a clear signal that at the expiration date, 
third party access renegotiations are a possibility if the economic situation changes and there is a 
third party interested in accessing the railway line and port facility. The length of the access holiday 
could be linked to the profitability of the mining project. This would guarantee that the leading 
mining company recoups its investment prior potential third party access. 
 
Even if the government grants the mining company ownership and management of the railway line, 
the government should always retain the right-of-way, as this reserved land on either side of the 
railway tracks should be considered a public good and can serve non-mining related infrastructure 
investments. For example, the right-of-way can be leveraged to lay power and telecommunication 
lines. The installation of such infrastructure along an existing rail corridor is significantly less than 
building it along a separate route and also maximizes the use of existing land reserved for 
transport/transmission infrastructure. If there is significant demand to use the right-of-way for non-
rail infrastructure, the government could tender the management of the right-of-way to a third party 
with clear goals and targets. 
 
2. Mining companies willing to share infrastructure. Little further foreseen economic 
benefit from multi-purpose access.  
 
 Design and operational model 
If there is a mutual net benefit for shared use of mining companies in the region and there is no 
foreseeable additional capacity needed on the line, the government should aim to avoid playing an 
interventionist role but rather act as an intermediary between the stakeholders. The mining 
companies may choose to invest in proportion to the capacity allocation.  
 
To maximize the efficiency of the operations, the government could negotiate for the rail operation 
to be managed by one entity under a haulage regime. Under a haulage regime the operator not 
only manages the access to the tracks or ‘below rail’ logistics, but also provides the rolling stock to 
the mining companies and charges for the services accordingly. The haulage services could either be 
performed by the leading mining company or a third party operator. This decision should be left to 
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the negotiations between the mining companies. While haulage regimes have not been tested in 
practice (one is being considered in Mongolia to export coal to China),
19
 the advantage of such 
regime compared to the more common access regime where each mining company provides its own 
rolling stock, results from economies of scale in acquisition, lower maintenance costs and higher 
effectiveness in operations. It also reduces the operational risks of different operators on the line in 
case of rolling stock failure.
20
 Higher efficiency in the rail operations may increase the bankability of 
the project.  
 
 Regulatory framework and level of intervention 
Unless there are complaints by one of the mining companies and there are no further players wanting 
to access the railway line and/or port terminal, the government should not intervene. As in the 
previous scenario, the legal framework should ensure that if the economic prospects in the region 
change and there is potential for further parties to claim access, there are mechanisms in place that 
could address such issues (clearly drafted blanket or sector specific access regimes).  
 
Example: Mining companies willing to share infrastructure – Marampa-Pepel Corridor 
 
African Minerals (AML) was awarded to mine the Tonkolili iron ore deposit in Sierra Leone in 
2009. As part of the agreement, AML was granted a 99-year exclusive infrastructure lease to 
reconstruct, manage and operate the Marampa – Pepel railway line and Pepel port. 
 
In 2012, AML signed a binding heads of agreement with Cape Lambert, which grants its Marampa 
Iron Ore subsidiary access to the infrastructure. The agreement foresees that Cape Lambert funds 
33% of the costs of the Marampa-Pepel Infrastructure upgrade in return for an equal share in the 
project. This would guarantee Cape Lambert 2mpta capacity allocation on the railway line 
(excluding rolling stock) and to the unloading, stockpiling and transshipping facilities at Pepel port.
21
 
Cape Lambert’s exposure included a cap of $45million. It has been reported that the service is to be 
at a cost plus 20% basis and Cape Lambert must design and construct its own 3km rail spur line to 
African Minerals rail line on its own.
22
 
 
3. High concerns over stranded mining assets without government intervention, but little 
further foreseen economic benefits resulting from multi-purpose access.  
 
 Design and operational model 
Given the competitive dynamics between mining companies, the emphasis of the operational model 
should lie on guaranteeing that the infrastructure is built to accommodate additional capacity and that 
tariffs are non-discriminatory. To guarantee the latter, the most effective mechanism available to the 
government is to separate the ownership of the infrastructure from the mining companies. This 
separation should include both rail and port infrastructure. In South Africa, the railway line to 
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Richards Bay is open access, but the coal terminal is company-owned. The latter has rejected 
allocating capacity to smaller mining companies seeking access,
23
 which has made open access on 
the railway line irrelevant. To avoid such capacity and access problems, it is best for the same entity 
to manage both the railway line and port terminal. Apart from simplifying the access and tariff 
negotiations and ensuring that the same capacities are being allocated, this system will increase 
efficiency along the corridor. It will also be easier to obtain project financing for an infrastructure 
project with fewer players.  
 
To separate the ownership, a special purpose vehicle (SPV) could be setup, which owns and 
operates the rail and port infrastructure.
24
 To finance the investment, the SPV will have to be 
backed by long-term take or pay agreements at set tariff rates that the mining companies guarantee to 
pay. This will set out the flow of revenues to the SPV upon completion of the infrastructure. With 
such agreement in place, it will be easier to source project financing. As principal backing agency for 
the SPV through its take or pay commitment, the leading mining company is likely to require 
founding rights such as priority access.  
 
With extensive mineral deposits known to be economically viable with access to rail and port 
infrastructure, the government can also explore the scope for tendering and awarding the 
construction and management of the rail and port infrastructure concession to a third party.  
As with the SPV arrangement, the third party will need long-term take or pay commitments to be 
able to raise the necessary capital for the infrastructure investments. However, awarding the rail and 
port concession to a third party (rather than to the leading mining company) could result in higher 
tariffs being charged to the users because: (1) hurdle rates are likely to be higher if the cost centers 
are separated, with uncertainty increasing for the mining company not having control over the export 
infrastructure and the infrastructure concessionaire depending on the mining company for the project 
to be viable in the first place, and (2) large-scale mining companies can rely on their balance sheets 
to either directly finance the infrastructure project or use it as a guarantee to access project finance at 
low interest rates, but third party logistics companies are unlikely to have such financial muscle. The 
associated increase in risk due to separation of ownership will further increase interest rates being 
charged to finance the project  
 
Example: Tendering mining-related rail and port infrastructure project to a third party – 
Tete-Macuse corridor 
To provide a logistics solution for the mining companies that have invested in coal concessions in 
Tete, the Government of Mozambique launched an international tender for the construction of the 
525km long Zambezi corridor, which connects Moatize with a greenfield port at Macuse. The tender 
foresees the design, finance, construction, management and operation of the rail and port 
infrastructure and requires multi-user and multi-purpose access.
25
 It has been reported that 21 
companies applied for the tender and 6 preferred bidders were selected to submit full bids.
26 
Italthai 
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available at : http://www.miningweekly.com/article/transnet-ceo-fumes-over-insufficient-small-guy-access-at-richards-
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engineering was officially announced to have been awarded the tender in December 2013
27
 and will 
be seeking off-take agreements with the mining companies to finance the project. While the number 
of bids suggests that there is great interest for such PPP project, which is estimated to cost around 
US$3.5bn, there have been concerns that the bidders have struggled to provide the bank guarantees 
that were demanded by the Government.
 28
 
 
There may be scope for negotiations to build the rail and port infrastructure marginally above 
capacity to take into account potential operational inefficiencies. However, mining companies are not 
inclined to finance capacity that they will not use. If the SPV and/or third party can make a good case 
to financiers that additional capacity is needed, this could be a viable alternative to guarantee excess 
capacity. If the government is certain that excess capacity will be needed, it can provide funding 
itself. However, this is a risky strategy if the future mining projects do not materialize. Instead, the 
government could require the infrastructure to be designed in such way that future capacity 
expansion is possible. Such clause has been included in the Putu contract, where “the railroad shall 
be designed so that it can be expanded on a commercially feasible basis to carry on a continuing 
basis twice as much traffic as is anticipated initially…”29 A similar design clause could be included 
for port infrastructure, which guarantees that the site selection offers potential to increase the 
capacity of the mineral terminal.  
While the haulage regime has the potential to increase efficiency along the corridor as explained in 
the previous scenario, and it would also guarantee that smaller mining companies that do not have 
the financial means to purchase rolling stock have access to the railway line, the additional cost of 
the rolling stock will have to be carried by the SPV or third party. 
 
 Regulatory framework and level of intervention 
If the leading mining company is reluctant to allow multi-user access and there is a high likelihood 
of stranded assets, the government can play a lead role in requiring the players to come up with a 
shared solution. Softer pressures can be applied. The construction of port and rail infrastructure 
involves numerous areas where the government can assist, including, for example, access to land, 
resettlement approval and environmental permits. These can be granted upon agreement by the 
industry to cooperate on the infrastructure development. 
 
Another option to increase the government’s influence on the port and rail infrastructure project is to 
co-finance the investment by acquiring an equity stake. This reduces the financial burden on the 
government compared to full state ownership
30
 and provides it with influencing opportunities within 
the SPV/PPP. However, raising the financial resources for paying for the equity might be a challenge 
-for countries with small budgets and high political risk ratings. Resource-for infrastructure deals 
have been one methodology used by governments to raise finance for such large-scale infrastructure 
investments, but those deals require a detailed financial analysis to ensure that the resources are not 
given away for a below-market value.  
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The government could also require a golden share to influence the decision-making process in 
strategic public interest infrastructure projects. A golden share is a nominal share conferring special 
voting rights that are established by law. It is typically a single share granting its owner sufficient 
voting rights to block board decisions. It is not attached to dividend rights as opposed to the equity 
above. The rights of a golden share can vary in scope and duration and range from a limited veto 
right to the need to consent to everyday management decisions. The golden share allows 
governments a controlling interest despite limited investment. This can be an efficient policy tool to 
influence open access decisions of port and rail infrastructure, but the leading mining company may 
not be willing to invest in the infrastructure if it does not have managing authority over it upon 
completion. 
 
With significantly higher risks of discrimination in access in this scenario, the government will need 
to focus its attention on setting up regulatory mechanisms and/or an independent regulatory 
body
31
 (apart from drafting blanket and/or sector specific access regulations). An independent 
regulator is preferable to relying on the judicial system, which is lengthier, less predictable, does not 
provide a long-term compliance monitoring, and relies on judges that are less likely to know about 
the rail and port sector.  
 
While the tasks and responsibilities of the regulatory body should be set out in the legislation, the 
level of intervention should be adapted to the maturity of the regulator and the competitive nature of 
the railway line/port terminal. With vertical separation between the mining companies and 
infrastructure owners and only mineral commodities being transported along the corridor, the 
regulator should closely supervise and monitor, but not aim to intervene in setting access charges and 
tariffs. It will also need to arbitrate cases that are put forward by third parties. If, on the other hand, 
the leading mining company also owns the rail and port infrastructure, stronger intervention may be 
necessary to guarantee that multi-user access is adhered to. 
 
Example: Setting up a regulatory authority for railways - Mozambique 
On August 12, 2011, the Government of Mozambique approved the National Surface Transport 
Regulator (INATTER), which has the mandate to regulate the rail and road transport. For the railway 
sector, the regulator has the competency to: 
i. Propose railway related legislative and regulatory measures to be approved by the 
government 
ii. Regulate the railway infrastructure construction and ensure that access of operators is 
non-discriminatory 
iii. Monitor that applicable regulatory laws, licenses and concession agreements are adhered 
to 
iv. Determine the introduction of technical improvements to increase the safety and 
efficiency of rail transport 
v. Analyse complaints by rail operators and arbitrate accordingly 
vi. Regulate the access to rail infrastructure and arbitrate accordingly 
vii. Guarantee and monitor the rights and interests of railway users 
 
While INATTER creates a mechanism for third parties to be able to seek access to rail infrastructure, 
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the fact that it is an entity within the Ministry of Transport and Communications, where the Minister 
appoints key personnel, poses uncertainty for the infrastructure owners that the arbitration process 
will be neutral and based on an independent assessment. It also remains to be seen whether 
INATTER has the political backing and technical capacity to impose its regulatory authority on the 
powerful state owned rail company, which has been in charge of setting tariffs on rail traffic in the 
past. The UK Department for International Development (DfID), which has supported the Ministry 
of Transport and Communications in setting up INATTER, has recognized these challenges and 
views “turning INATTER into a robust and independent regulatory body as a medium to long term 
endeavour.”32 
 
 
4. High potential to unlock economic development along the corridor  
 
 Design and operational model 
As set out in the cost benefit analysis (step 2), multi-purpose access to rail requires additional 
infrastructure investments such as dry ports, loading and off-loading facilities, and is likely to make 
the corridor less efficient. Similarly, greenfield ports that are required to cater for additional non-
mineral terminals will require significant additional investments. These will not be voluntarily 
financed by the mining sector and therefore the government will need to either finance the additional 
investments directly, through a loan with the investor, through a financier, an international 
development agency, or through tax offsets.  
 
While agriculture and passenger services are unlikely to take up significant amounts of capacity 
compared to the mineral cargo that makes the construction of a railway line feasible in the first place, 
double track rail systems can decrease the operational bottlenecks. In case there is sufficient 
capacity to warrant such investment, the government should push for a double track rail system or 
require it in the tender. Double track avoids the operational complexities of having to carefully 
coordinate inbound and outbound trains. This will result in trains being able to haul more wagons, 
travel at higher speeds and lower operational costs. The construction of a double track system is 
estimated to be 24% cheaper in the case of the Buchanan corridor in Liberia if 36mtpa of iron-ore 
were to be transported on a double track railway system compared to two single-track lines.
33
 Such 
system also allows for higher travelling speeds for passenger services. 
 
In case multi-purpose access comes at a significant cost and there is a lack of road infrastructure in 
place, the government could also negotiate for the service road of the railway line to be designed 
and built to accommodate road haulage and passenger transport.  
 
 Regulatory framework and level of intervention 
To guarantee multi-purpose access on a railway line that is built to service the mining sector, the 
government will not only have to monitor and ensure non-discriminatory access, but will also have to 
define the tariff setting mechanism. This is especially the case for more price sensitive cargoes 
such as agriculture products and passenger services. Public Service Obligation (PSO) schemes have 
been used in Africa in the past to warrant for passenger services. These involve the government 
subsidizing passenger rail services. However, the track record of these agreements is unstable, due to 
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governments not paying out the subsidies in practice. This has created a system where even if the 
government were to guarantee the subsidy during the negotiations, the investors are wary that this 
agreement might not be upheld due to the lack of long-term credibility.
34
 
 
An alternative in such circumstances could be to contractually require price discrimination and 
cross-subsidization between the higher-profit mining industry and the price-sensitive 
agriculture sector/passenger services. For example, price-sensitive services could be charged at 
marginal cost, which will cover the operations of the service, but not the infrastructure investments; 
whereas the mining related services are charged at average cost plus the difference of the price-
sensitive services.
35
 
 
To ensure that tariffs are set by the operator in such a way that guarantee price-sensitive goods and 
passenger services to be transported on the railway line, the government could impose a more 
interventionist monitoring system whereby the regulator needs to pre-approve the tariffs that the 
operator wants to charge. This system has been adopted by EFVM railway in Brazil. However, as 
highlighted above, such system should only be considered if the regulator is independent and has the 
capacity to be involved in such an interventionist manner. 
 
5. Cross-border potential to increase trade and unlock economic development along the 
corridor 
 
 Design and operational model  
Apart from requiring negotiations with the leading mining company, cross-border infrastructure 
projects will also require negotiations with the neighboring country government. These negotiations 
involve political, managerial and technical decision-making.  
 
On the technical side, the governments and the mining companies need to agree on the design of the 
railway infrastructure. If the railway line is purely designed for high volume ore/coal transportation, 
wider gauges (distance between the inner surfaces of the rail) might be the preferred choice by the 
mining company, as this setup can carry heavier loads while travelling at faster speeds. However, if 
the proposed project is meant to connect to the existing rail networks in the region, it makes sense to 
build the railway gauge accordingly. Different gauge settings between the two countries could lead 
to a significant increase in transport costs with transshipping or gauge changes becoming necessary 
at the border. 
 
On the managerial front, governments need to agree on the border management system. Long delays 
at the border due to lengthy customs controls, predatory officials, and/or the necessity to change 
crews and locomotives at borders will result in inefficiencies. It is therefore recommended that an 
integrated border management system is put in place and that customs procedures are 
streamlined.  
 
An additional stakeholder in the negotiations and the associated increase in political risk due to cross 
border transportation is likely to result in increased difficulties to source funding. For regional 
integration projects, multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and/or the African Development 
Bank can be considered to help with the financing.  
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 Regulatory framework and level of intervention 
For the mining leading company to feel comfortable to invest in a cross border infrastructure project, 
it needs to be sure that political tensions between the countries will not result in disruptions to its 
services. A tri-partite agreement that establishes the binding nature of the provisions that are 
agreed on should be signed. This should include the type of goods that will be transported on the 
line, the principle of transit cargo and the open access rules. These agreements should be embedded 
in both domestic and international law. An intergovernmental rail authority could help supervise 
the tariff structure and pricing mechanisms of non-mineral services.  
 
Example: Potential cross-country logistics solution – Guinea/Liberia 
 
Liberia has significant iron ore deposits under development on the border to Guinea. ArcelorMittal is 
rehabilitating the 250km railway line from Yekepa to Buchanan and developing the iron ore terminal 
at Buchanan port to a capacity of 15mpta. This corridor could also serve as a potential logistics 
solution for the iron ore deposits on the Guinean side, including the Nimba, Diake, Belekoyo and 
Simandou deposits.
36
 The shortest route through Guinea for the Simandou deposit is Conakry, which 
is 800km away, as compared to 350km to the port of Buchanan in Liberia.
37
 The World Bank 
estimates that that the cost savings of going through Liberia are roughly US$1 billion over a twenty-
year period (US$3.49 per tonne via Conakry versus US$1.22 per tonne via Buchanan) when the full 
lifecycle costs of running the two alternative railroads are taken into account. Furthermore, Vale 
states that the deep-sea waters (>28m), which are critical to the use of its Valemax vessels, are at a 
2km to 3km distance from the Liberian shore in comparison to a 15km to 20km distance in Guinea.
38
 
 
While the Guinean Government has required Rio Tinto to export the Simandou deposits via Guinea, 
it has signed bilateral agreement with Liberia to allow companies mining the Nimba deposit to use 
the Liberian transport route. It has recently been reported that Sable Mining, a concession holder of 
the Nimba iron ore project in South-West Guinea, has been granted an export license authorizing the 
transport of iron ore through the Port of Buchanan.
39
 The company is seeking to initially transport 
5mtpa via the existing railway line of ArcelorMittal.
40
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STEP 4: Negotiating points 
Having understood the importance and potential impact of multi-user and multi-purpose access, the government will need to prepare its 
negotiating strategy. The strategy will highly depend on the particular set of circumstances it is confronted with. The table below provides a non-
exclusive list of the key negotiation points depending on the scenarios addressed above.  
Scenario 
Preferred Operating 
Model 
Regulatory 
Framework/ 
Government 
Intervention 
Benefits Risks Key Negotiating Points 
1. Single mine, little 
foreseen economic 
benefit from open 
access 
 Vertically integrated 
model from pit-to-
port 
 Blanket or sector 
specific open access 
regimes  
 Non-interventionist 
 Maximize efficiency 
of mining project and 
thereby government 
revenues 
 Difficult to guarantee 
capacity and access to 
third parties in the 
future 
 Access holidays 
 Open access guarantee 
after termination of 
access holidays 
 Reserve right-of-way 
2. Joint agreed 
investment by mining 
companies, little 
foreseen benefit from 
open access beyond 
those users 
 SPV 
 Haulage regime 
 Blanket or sector 
specific open access 
regimes  
 Non-interventionist 
 Maximize government 
revenues from mining 
sector in the region 
 Difficult to guarantee 
capacity and access to 
third non-financing 
parties in the future 
 Access holidays 
 Open access guarantee 
after termination of 
access holidays  
 Reserve right-of-way 
 Haulage regime by 
miner or third party 
3. Danger of stranded 
mining assets, little 
foreseen benefit from 
multi-purpose access 
 SPV or third party 
operated 
infrastructure model 
(vertically separated) 
 Haulage regime or 
access regime 
(depending on 
financing and 
maturity of regulator) 
 Blanket or sector 
specific open access 
regimes 
 Equity or golden 
share of government 
 Independent 
regulatory body for 
monitoring and 
arbitration  
 Unlocking the mining 
potential of the region  
 Higher government 
revenues as a result of 
the development of 
smaller mining 
projects 
 Additional 
employment 
opportunities and 
linkages to the mining 
 Delay in negotiations 
with leading mining 
company 
 Delay in government 
revenues from leading 
mining company 
 Difficulty to negotiate 
financing for the 
project 
 Reserve right-of-way  
 Cooperation among 
mining companies 
 Capacity for existing 
mining projects 
 Capacity for potential 
future mining projects  
 Capacity expansion 
design & priority 
access/ founding rights 
for leading mining 
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Scenario 
Preferred Operating 
Model 
Regulatory 
Framework/ 
Government 
Intervention 
Benefits Risks Key Negotiating Points 
sector customer 
 Double track design of 
railway 
4. Danger of stranded 
mining assets, high 
potential for unlocking 
economic potential with 
multi-user and multi-
purpose access 
 SPV or third party 
operated model 
 Haulage regime or 
access regime 
(depending on 
financing and 
maturity of regulator) 
 
 Blanket or sector 
specific open access 
regimes 
 Equity or golden 
share of government 
 Independent 
regulatory body for 
monitoring, tariff-
oversight and 
arbitration 
 Unlocking the mining 
potential of the region  
 Higher government 
revenues as a result of 
the development of 
smaller mining 
projects 
 Additional 
employment 
opportunities and 
linkages to the mining 
sector  
 Attract non-mining 
related investment 
along the corridor, 
which is likely to be 
more labour intensive 
 Increased trade along 
the corridor 
 Delay in negotiations 
with leading mining 
company 
 Delay in government 
revenues from leading 
and subsequent mining 
companies 
 Leading mining 
company abandoning 
project 
 Difficulty to acquire 
financing for the 
project 
 Loss of efficiency on 
the railway line 
 Uncertainty of whom 
will finance the non-
mining related 
infrastructure 
 Reserve right-of-way  
 Cooperation with 
subsequent mining 
companies 
 Capacity for existing 
mining projects 
 Capacity for potential 
future mining projects 
 Capacity for non-
mining projects 
 Double track design of 
railway  
 Open access to service 
road for non-mineral 
cargo 
 Financing of non-
mining related 
infrastructure 
 Capacity expansion 
design & priority 
access for foundation 
customer 
 Cross-subsidization 
 Open access service 
road 
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Scenario 
Preferred Operating 
Model 
Regulatory 
Framework/ 
Government 
Intervention 
Benefits Risks Key Negotiating Points 
5. Cross-border 
potential increase trade 
and to unlock economic 
development along the 
corridor 
 SPV or third party 
operated model 
 Haulage regime or 
access regime 
(depending on 
maturity of regulator) 
 Integrated border 
management system 
 Tri-party agreement 
that sets out the open 
access regime 
 Intergovernmental 
railway authority 
involved in tariff 
oversight  
 Unlocking the mining 
potential of the region  
 Higher government 
revenues as a result of 
the development of 
smaller mining 
projects 
 Additional 
employment 
opportunities and 
linkages to the mining 
sector  
 Attract non-mining 
related investment 
along the corridor, 
which is likely to be 
more labour intensive 
 Increased trade along 
the corridor 
 Regional integration 
 Lower capital and 
operational costs if 
cross border route is 
shorter than 
alternative 
 Delay in negotiations 
with leading mining 
company 
 Delay in government 
revenues from leading 
and subsequent mining 
companies 
 Leading mining 
company abandoning 
project 
 Difficulty to acquire 
financing for the 
project 
 Loss of efficiency on 
the railway line 
 Uncertainty of whom 
will finance the non-
mining related 
infrastructure 
 Reserve right-of-way  
 Cooperation with 
subsequent mining 
companies 
 Capacity for existing 
mining projects 
 Capacity for potential 
future mining projects 
 Capacity for non-
mining projects 
 Double track design of 
railway or service road 
utilization for non-
mineral cargo 
 Financing of non-
mining related 
infrastructure 
 Capacity expansion 
design  
 Cross-subsidization 
 Transit fee negotiation 
with neighbouring 
government 
 Integrated border 
management system 
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The table above shows what has been raised at the beginning of the rail and port section of 
the framework: The more players that are involved, the more points need to be addressed in 
the negotiations and the more complex they become. How strongly the government 
should/can push on each negotiation point will depend on the cost-benefit analysis, the 
viability of the mining project under a shared-use agreement, and on the willingness of the 
company to accept these conditions. The government should assess its leverage prior entering 
the negotiations. This will depend on the characteristics of the mining concession (quality and 
profitability), market conditions, the costs imposed on companies in competing mining 
jurisdictions, the likelihood that another mining company will buy the concession and build 
the infrastructure in question if negotiations fail, and the ease of finding a financier for the 
project. Ultimately, the legal arrangements of a mining related infrastructure agreement will 
be the reflection of what is financially doable, rather than the other way around.
41
 Any shared 
use agreement will require the government to provide the leading mining company with 
founding rights to guarantee its capacity is secured on the infrastructure for the length of the 
agreement. 
  
                                                 
41
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projects. 
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Framework 2 
Shared Use in the context of Power 
 
Introduction 
 
According to the World Bank’s Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic, Africa’s largest 
infrastructure deficit lies in the power sector, whether it is measured in terms of generation 
capacity, electricity consumption or security of supply. The power generation capacity of the 
48 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (with a combined population of 800 million) roughly 
equates to the power generation capacity of Spain (with a population of 45 million). Power 
consumption, at around 124 kilowatt hours per capita per year is only a tenth of the 
consumption in other developing countries – it corresponds to one 100-watt light bulb per 
person for three hours a day.
42
 Only one in three Africans has access to electricity and the un-
electrified depend primarily on kerosene or diesel. In this context, mining companies often 
choose to generate their own power to run their operations. This causes a deadweight loss for 
all parties: 
- for the mines: although self–generation is often more reliable than the grid, it 
increases the operating costs of the mine considerably; 
- for the utility: self-generation means loss of large-scale and anchor customers; and 
- for the country: self-generation means a less profitable mining sector and reduced 
opportunities for linkages and sustainable development.  
 
However, as this section explains, by capitalizing on the mining industry’s demand for 
energy, it is possible to develop the national power generation facilities and electricity 
transmission systems as well as increase access to electricity in remote areas where mining 
companies tend to operate. Effective coordination could even result in the mines benefiting 
from considerable cost-savings.  
 
Key Definitions 
 
Independent Power Producer (IPP): An IPP is an entity which is not a public utility, but 
which owns facilities to generate electricity for sale to utilities and sometimes end users.  
 
Power Purchase Agreement (PPA): Where capacity expansion is required, the investment 
costs must be recoverable and revenue streams sufficiently definite into the future to enable 
the owner to obtain financing on reasonable terms. Therefore, regulations often allow 
providers and customers to enter into long-term contracts called PPAs, whereby the 
customers (the utility or other users) commit to buying a minimum amount of capacity from 
the owner over a longer period.  In addition to indicating who would buy the power, “a strong 
PPA details quantity and cost of power bought, dispatching of plants, fuel metering, 
interconnection, insurance, force majeure, transfer, termination, change of legal provisions, 
refinancing arrangements and dispute resolution mechanisms.”43 
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STEP 1: Assessing the current situation - What is at stake? 
 
An important first step is to assess how mining companies are currently powering their 
operations, and why they choose this particular arrangement. At the extremes, mining 
companies are either completely self-sufficient, or able to source their power from national 
infrastructure. An assessment of the country’s infrastructure situation and institutional gaps is 
important in order to identify the most realistic scenarios for power-mine synergies and the 
necessary steps to achieve them.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-Generation 
 
 
Grid-Sourced Power 
 
 
 
 
Insufficient Supply: 
 Insufficient generation capacity to meet local 
demand let alone industrial demand 
 Depending on the stage and type of 
operations, mines require a large amount of 
power 
Abundant & Reliable Power: 
 
 Sufficient, reliable power source from 
grid  
 Clear and credible institutional and 
regulatory environment 
Unreliable Supply:  
 Frequent power outages, seasonal power 
variations  
 Power is crucial to mining operations, and 
mines need to ensure reliability of power 
High Cost of Grid Power: 
 Expensive fuel sources (e.g. diesel, HFO) 
along with inefficient transmission results in 
high costs to the end user. 
 Power intensity of mining operations means 
that profit margins are highly sensitive to 
power costs  
Low cost of power: 
 
 Cost of grid power is less than the cost 
of self-generation 
Lack of Transmission Infrastructure: 
 Transmission network does not extend to 
mines 
 Transmission network is unable to carry high 
voltage capacity for industrial use, requiring 
relatively costly upgrade work as compared 
with costs of self-generation. 
Low cost of connection: 
 
 Transmission infrastructure extends to 
mining area or investment required to 
connect to grid is profitable given 
distance load and cost of generation 
 
How do mining companies 
currently generate electricity? 
 
Why? 
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The type of power sourcing arrangement will also be influenced by the type of mining 
operation. Mining operations need more or less power depending on the commodity and even 
more on the processing involved. Aluminium smelting will be a power intensive operation 
whereas coal, iron-ore, platinum or gold mining will require small amounts of power. Power 
costs can constitute between 10% and 25% of operational costs and the more the operation is 
power-intensive, the more the mines will look to source inexpensive power.
44
   
 
STEP 2: Identifying the operational synergies 
 
Leveraging the mining industry’s power demand and its capital investments in power 
infrastructure can facilitate the development of the national power system. From the situation 
where mines have to self-generate due to a lack-, or unreliability of national generation and 
transmission infrastructure, to one where mines can source power from a large-scale grid, 
there exists the potential for mining companies to help develop the national power sector. The 
figure below illustrates the wide range of possible potential power arrangements in the space 
between mine self-generation and grid supply.  
 
Spectrum of Power Sourcing Arrangements 
 
Source: World Bank
45
 
 
This section explores a range of options between self-supply and grid supply. 
 
a. Mines and Supply to Communities: Leveraging Mines for Rural Electrification 
In the situation where there is no grid, or the grid is too remote from the mining area, mines 
will have little choice but to self-generate. In this case, opportunities exist for mines to supply 
power to surrounding areas. They could utilize off-grid renewable energy solutions – these 
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are becoming more popular among mining companies and more sustainable in terms of 
operational costs, health, or environmental impacts as compared to diesel-based solutions.
46
  
Another option is the development of a mini-grid that could also be based on renewable 
energy. Such an arrangement could involve the mining companies partnering with donors, 
NGOs and utilities. For example, the mining company could establish the mini-grid and the 
utility could be in charge of operations, management, tariff collection and any additional 
policy initiatives. 
 
Example: Mini-grids in Tanzania and Guinea 
One current illustration of a mini-grid initiative is a hybrid partnership between 
Tanzania’s state-owned utility TANESCO and private stakeholders, supported by United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The project is called the 2012 
Global Environment Facility (GEF4) project and its objective is to build mini-grids based 
on micro hydropower to improve rural electrification in Tanzania.
47 
 
Another example is Rio Tinto and Infraco’s planned initiative to electrify the town of 
Beyla, a town of 22,000 inhabitants expecting to grow given its proximity to Rio Tinto’s 
Simandou mine The project will consist of installing a 1MW hydro power plant on the 
Cessou river close to the village of Famoila, connecting the hydro plant to the town of 
Beyla by a 20 km 20kV transmission line and completing and expanding the existing 
distribution system in Beyla. The project is planned to be owned through an integrated 
electric distribution utility “Beyla Energy” with a concession to generate and distribute 
electricity within the prefecture of Beyla.
48
 
 
The 2011 World Bank Africa Infrastructure report notes that governments have been 
subsidizing the power sector in an effort to increase access to electricity to a wider segment 
of the population. However, rather than increasing access, the benefits of these subsidies have 
largely accrued to already connected rich and non-poor consumers, to the exclusion of the 
largely non-grid connected low-income households in these countries. Given that much of the 
population in these countries remains unconnected, the current power tariff subsidy system 
has had little effect on expanding access to power.  Governments could consider re-directing 
public funds away from the usual, largely ineffective power tariff subsidies towards a more 
focused subsidization of mini-grid development, which could lead to a more sustainable 
strategy for collaboration with mining companies on rural electrification initiatives. Such 
initiatives could also increase a mining company’s social license to operate in these areas, in 
addition to assisting the government in meeting their rural electrification goals. 
 
b. Mines and Excess Supply: Leveraging Mines for Increased Power Generation 
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Where local conditions have led mining companies to generate their own power, there may 
be situations in which mining companies can be incentivized to produce extra power capacity 
to be sold back to the grid.  
 
Example: Excess Power Supply by Mines in Mozambique 
In Mozambique, the presence of non-exportable low quality thermal coal in the Moatize 
deposits presents the opportunity for mining companies to build power plants both for 
their own consumption and to sell power generated from thermal coal deposits for local 
consumption. At present, four mining companies in the region have plans to construct 
coal-fired power stations, which use their thermal coal deposits for the generation of 
electricity. The power will be used in their own mining operations, and the excess will 
be purchased and distributed by Electricidade de Moçambique (EDM), or by members of 
the Southern African Power Pool. The most advanced of these plans is Vale’s Moatize 
plant. The initial phase would involve a net plant capacity of 270MW, of which the mine 
will consume 220MW, with the remainder to be sold to EDM, transmitted via the 
Northern Grid. 
49
  
 
Given the capital expenditure involved in building self-generation and the large potential 
economies of scale in power investments, there may be a business case for mines to 
coordinate a joint-investment. 
 
c. Mines as an anchor for IPPs: Leveraging mines for increased generation 
Given their large power needs, mines can also be used as anchor customers for IPP 
generation investments. If the proposed generation investment promises cheaper power than 
their current self-generation arrangements on a reliable basis, mining companies could be 
incentivized to buy power from such projects under an offtake agreement, which provides 
demand guarantees to increase the bankability of the power investment. 
The structure of such an arrangement can take a number of forms. For example, the mine 
could simply be the offtaker in an IPP project, or it could play a more active role in the IPP 
investment as part of a joint venture.    
 
Example: Mine as an Offtaker in Sierra Leone 
In Sierra Leone, the Government has signed a Heads of Terms with Joule Africa, an 
Independent Power Producer to develop Bumbuna II and the extension of Bumbuna I. They 
have completed a pre-feasibility study which reveals that the project could generate power of 
up to 372MW with a firm capacity of 112MW in the dry season. Interviews with London 
Mining indicate that they have expressed interest in being an offtaker for some of this power, 
under the right circumstances. 
50
 
Example: Mines in Joint Venture Power Investment in Mauritania 
Under a PPP agreement, the government, the national power utility (40%), the state-owned 
mining company SNIM (26%) and Kinross Gold Corp. (34%) will develop a 350MW gas 
power plant using the Banda offshore gas field in Mauritania. The arrangement under this 
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PPP is to set up a club of auto-producers with PPAs between the users and the shareholders: 
the goal is to make a minimum return out of the investment, keep the costs down (12 cts/ 
kwh) and shareholder-users (such as Kinross) will still have to pay a user fee. As a result, the 
electricity will be used for mining activities, domestic Mauritanian consumption and could 
eventually be exported to neighbouring countries.
51
  
 
Role of Mine in Mine-IPP Joint Venture 
 
 
The mining company facilitates the investment as: 
 
- Investment Initiator: The mining company would initiate/facilitate the investment in the 
first instance, and can bring in strong developers, EPC contractors, lenders, investors and 
advisers. The mining company’s commercial incentives to keep costs down would facilitate 
the use of more competitive contractors. 
- Equity Investor: The mining company, in the planned investments mentioned above, could 
contribute to meeting the equity requirements of the project. 
- Partial offtaker: The mining company will offtake a certain proportion of the power. This 
will help with the bankability of the deal, as the mining company may be a credible off-taker, 
and the company’s overall balance sheet and creditworthiness can help to underpin the deal. 
The credibility of the mine as an off-taker should be carefully assessed. For instance, some 
miners are junior companies with an undiversified portfolio. In this situation an IPP would be 
inherently taking on some country/project specific risk, without the cushion of a 
multinational balance sheet.   
 
While it is preferable for a significant amount of power to be bought up by the government to 
be supplied nationally to end users, the state-owned public utility is often a significantly less 
credit-worthy partner and a guaranteed offtake from the utility would not ensure the 
bankability of the project. As public utilities generally also subsidize power tariffs, so that the 
full cost of financing the investment is unlikely to be reflected as a pass through in the tariff, 
lenders will require additional comfort that they will be repaid.
52
 The presence of the utility 
as an offtaker therefore necessitates a number of risk mitigation demands from financiers, 
such as sovereign guarantees, escrow accounts, letters of credit and Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) insurance. 
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d. Mines source from Grid: Leveraging Mines for Increased Generation and 
Transmission Infrastructure 
Finally, we can consider the case where there is sufficient and inexpensive power available 
through the national grid to supply the mines. In this case, it is important that the mine’s 
power demand does not overburden the grid, or that mine supply is not prioritized over 
residential demand.  
 
However, with the prospect of inexpensive access to electricity, such as in the case of gas-
based or hydro-based grids, mining companies will generally be willing to work with utilities 
and sometimes competitors under various commercial arrangements to set up, or just upgrade 
generation, transmission and distribution capacity to meet their demand.  
It is important to find commercial frameworks that lead to cost savings for the mining 
industry and allow the development of the country’s power infrastructure. Several 
commercial frameworks are proposed below. 
 
 Mines extend transmission infrastructure: Mining companies may have to pay some of 
the investment costs of transmission lines and substations to connect to the grid and get 
compensated. 
A common arrangement between the mining company and the utility to improve the national 
grid is for the mine to both build the infrastructure and provide a ‘loan’ to the utility that can 
be repaid (with interest) in cash, or in kind through an off-set in the invoicing for power 
purchased by the mine, as is the case in Burkina Faso with Semafo and in DRC with Katanga 
Mining. The extension of transmission infrastructure to remote mining areas could then allow 
the connection of small-scale users of power in the area to be connected to the national 
supply, if the utility is able to install the necessary distribution, monitoring and enforcement 
infrastructure.  
 
Example: Transmission Investments in Burkina Faso and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC)  
 
In October 2011 the Canadian-based mining company Semafo signed an agreement with the 
Burkina Faso Government for the electricity supply to its Mana mine through a transmission 
line estimated to cost US$19 million and reduce the mine power costs by US$40/oz. Sonabel, 
the national power utility, would receive half of the money from Semafo and repay it over 
eight years following commissioning.  As a result of such an investment, energy costs for the 
mine will drop from $0.31/kWh to $0.18/kWh. 
 
In the DRC, to avoid costly self-generation, Katanga Mining Ltd took over the upgrade of the 
national grid, and in March 2012 signed an agreement with SNEL, DRC’s public utility, for a 
US$283.5 million loan. US$189 million will be reimbursed to the company by its affiliates at 
the mines of Kansuki and Mutanda which will utilize a substantial part of the new electricity 
produced, 10% of the power generated will be extra and sold back to SNEL and US$261.8 
million of this investment will be reimbursed through utility bill credits with SNEL paying 
interests on the loan.
53
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To limit the number of loans incurred by the public utility, the potential for pooling resources 
between mining companies around shared transmission infrastructure should always be 
assessed. In some mining basin such as the coal basin in Tete province in Mozambique, 
mines might be close enough to be able to share the same sub-station and the transmission 
line. 
 
 Mines get priority access and either provide emergency generation capacity or pay a 
premium rate:  Energy crises are frequent in Africa and load shedding can generate 
higher costs of production for the mines; therefore mines are always interested in priority 
access to power supply.  Since it can come at a cost for the rest of the country, there is an 
absolute need for a mutually beneficial compensation scheme in place:  
 
- Mines could invest in extra emergency power infrastructure  
- Mines could make available the idle capacity of their emergency generators  
- Mines could negotiate a premium access rate  
Example: Mines get priority access 
 
 In Ghana, the 2006-2007 energy crisis led a consortium of four mining companies (Newmont 
Ghana Gold Ltd, AngloGold Ashanti, Goldfields Ghana, Golden Star Resources) to build an 
80 megawatt dual fuel Thermal Plant at Tema. It was completed in 2007. As part of the 
agreement, the ownership was transferred to the public utility, the Volta River Authority, and 
the plant now serves as a back-up for the mines in case of another energy crisis. 
54
 
 
In Zimbabwe, New Dawn Mining Corp.’s gold Turk-Angelus Mine is connected to the 
national power grid through an 88KVA line and has three generators that are used as a 
standby during any faults and that can supply 3MW of power. However, the Zimbabwe 
Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA) proposed the introduction of an uninterrupted electrical 
supply arrangement with power charged at a premium rate, which is still lower than the cost 
of operating the generators. Given that a suitable power line was available, the mine opted to 
enter into an agreement with ZESA and moved its generators to another location.
55
 
 
A last example comes from India: In 2006 the city of Pune in the state of Maharashtra, 
experienced load shedding for two to three hours per day due to an estimated shortfall of 
90MW of generating capacity of the Maharashtra State Power Generation Company. At the 
same time, the top 30 industrial operators in Pune had unutilized captive capacity of 100MW. 
In this context, the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), which comprises more than 
9,000 companies, including mining companies and energy producers, proposed to the 
Maharashatra Electricity Regulatory Commission that the operators utilize more of their idle 
capacity and less of the grid power to meet the shortfall in exchange for compensation based 
on the difference between the grid high-transmission tariff and its generating cost. The 
compensation costs were to be borne by consumers in Pune, in return for no load-shedding.
56
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 Mining companies accept to pay higher tariffs if the investment is carried out by the 
utility: Alternatively, by paying higher tariffs mines could increase the financial capacity 
of the public utility, allow the utility to reach cost–recovery level and as a result allow the 
utility itself to invest in generation and transmission. However the framework 
underpinning the mine’s purchase of power must allow the flexibility to increase prices, 
not only to account for inflation, but also to allow for the cost of wider infrastructure 
investments to be reflected in the tariffs. Given the mining companies’ need for certainty, 
and preference to lock in tariffs in long-term offtake agreements, the parameters for the 
inclusion of such costs should be pre-agreed.  
 
Example: Mines pay higher tariffs to fund power sector investment in Zambia 
 
In Zambia, the copper industry growth has been constrained by available electricity supply. 
At the same time, the electricity tariffs for the mines were the lowest in Africa and protected 
by a stabilization agreement between 2008 and 2011. Copperbelt Energy Corporation Plc, the 
independent power transmission group warned that industrial electricity tariffs would need to 
increase by 20-30% per year to reflect actual costs and support new investments in power 
generation. In 2011, with the tariff stabilization coming to an end and under approval of the 
regulator, Zesco, the public utility, increased by 30% its bulk supply tariff to CEC which was 
passed on to the mines.
57
 
 
 
STEP 3: Verifying the necessary preconditions 
 
3A: What are the necessary preconditions for each potential power-mine synergy? 
Solution Necessary Preconditions 
 
Mines + Rural 
Electrification 
 
 
 
 Contractual requirement for mines to participate in rural 
electrification initiatives 
 Coordination between mining companies and 
donor/government/NGOs 
 Clear framework articulating responsibilities of each party 
 Capacity of each party to carry out their role 
 Presence of local government/utility in rural areas 
 Effective demand/willingness to pay for power in communities 
 
 
Mines + Excess 
Supply 
 
 Liberalized power market with clear legislative and regulatory 
framework for private sector auto producers of power 
 Excess capacity built in at design phase of power plant project 
 Commercially viable offtake agreement between company and 
utility 
 Credible state-owned utility, if acting as offtaker  
 Adequate transmission infrastructure to offtake and distribute 
power 
 Demand for excess power (national or as part of regional power 
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pool) 
 
 
Mines as an anchor 
for IPPs 
 
 Liberalized power market with clear legislative and regulatory 
framework for IPPs 
 Sufficient IPP power supply to meet mining demand as well as 
excess supply for national grid 
 Sufficiently low cost and reliable power supply anticipated (vis-à-
vis current self-supply arrangement) to incentivise mining 
company to act as offtaker 
 Power plant to be available to fit with mine’s planned timetable. 
Other mine logistics (rail, port) not likely to delay mining project 
and thus mining power demand 
 Investment in transmission infrastructure to supply power to mine 
site 
 Utility to act as a credible partial offtaker of power from IPP 
 
 
Mines source from 
grid 
 
 Sufficient and reliable national power supply to meet demand 
 Cost of power sufficiently low to dis-incentivize mining company 
from self-supply, but sufficiently high to enable utility to achieve 
cost recovery (covering capital and operating costs) 
 Transmission infrastructure in place to supply mine or extension 
as a manageable investment 
 Management of mine’s power demand so as not to saturate the 
national grid 
 Commercial frameworks in place to incentivize mines to 
participate in or fund upgrade of transmission infrastructure and 
development of national power generation capacity   
 
 
 
3B: Are these preconditions in place? 
 
a. Institutional, Legal and Regulatory Framework 
            Legal Framework 
In order to realize these power-mine synergies, countries need to provide a sufficiently 
predictable environment to attract investments by mining companies and IPPs in the power 
sector. Until recently, the power sectors of many African countries have been monopolized 
by a vertically integrated state-owned utility. The national electricity sectors also need to be 
sufficiently liberalized to allow for the mining investments in power generation to 
supplement the public utility’s investments or for the mining demand to attract IPPs.  
 
In most African countries, the purchaser under the PPA is the public entity as the sole buyer. 
If the system is structured as a wholesale market such as in Ghana, the PPA can be signed 
between the mining company and a large-scale user, or between the mining company and an 
IPP. A mining company may be incentivized to invest in extra-capacity where there is no 
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single-buyer requirement – if the utility’s financial capacity is limited, or it is un-
creditworthy, then the mining company can count on the presence of large customers for 
excess generation. The challenge of this arrangement is that the excess generation would be 
“captured” by large-scale end-users, thus leaving the public utility with low levels of 
income.
58
  This arrangement should therefore be carefully assessed against projections of 
power demand.  
 
While liberalization efforts have begun or are in progress, in many countries legislation to 
allow private participation in the power sector is still in development. When the legal 
framework is ill-defined, many critical details such as the clear sharing of responsibilities 
between public and private parties, performance obligations, dispute resolution mechanisms 
and the ownership status of assets are left to negotiation and give little visibility to the 
investor. This approach of “regulation by contract” will only work with a supportive legal 
environment providing a clear and non-conflicting framework and which can ensure the 
enforceability of contracts. Its success will also depend on both the government’s capacity to 
negotiate a very complex contract and its commitment to transparency, given that contracts 
are often bilaterally negotiated behind closed doors.   
             
 Regulator 
 
In addition, such a liberalized market must be well-regulated. Strong regulatory oversight is 
fundamental to attract IPPs to serve the mines or for the mines to act as IPPs by selling their 
excess supply. 
 
The regulator must manage a number of responsibilities: 
 
- First, the regulator must manage risks and monitor contractual obligations with IPPs. 
Regulators play an important role to enforce contracts, as well as to strengthen the 
position of utilities that cannot provide sovereign guarantees—this could be through 
mechanisms such as such as escrow accounts, profit repatriation, and guarantees against 
nationalization. 
-     Second, regulatory oversight of tariffs charged by the mining company selling under 
the PPA is necessary whatever the structure of the power market (vertically integrated 
with private participation, wholesale market or retail markets) to ensure the viability of 
the market for end-users.
59
 Of course to incentivize companies to generate extra 
electricity, prices cannot be set too low. The regulatory institution must set cost-recovery 
tariffs to enable the utility and private companies to maintain equipment and make further 
capital investments. One method of price regulation is to have a light touch system 
whereby the regulator does not fix the prices, but reviews the prices that have been fixed 
by the parties, and issues comments on their reasonableness until they reach an adequate 
level, as is the case in Nigeria for instance.60 
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-     Third, there is a need to ensure that mining companies have access to the 
transmission network at non-discriminatory tariffs when they are authorized to sell power 
to third parties. This is particularly needed in a context where the utility might be tempted 
to increase its prices for competitors, and favour the electricity produced by its own 
generators.61 
It should be noted, that the most appropriate regulatory system depends on the institutional 
context and the reforms being undertaken. It may be that an independent regulator is not 
necessarily essential to the reform process. If the institutional capacity of a country is limited, 
they could instead outsource regulatory functions to a third party or expert panel.
62
  
 
Questions: 
- Is a clear legal and regulatory framework in place in the power sector? 
- Does the regulatory body have enough capacity to perform its function? 
- Can the framework and institutions be strengthened through capacity building to 
reach necessary levels? 
- Are there other constraints aside from lack of capacity which might impede a 
well-functioning institutional environment (e.g. political economy 
considerations)? 
 
b. State-Owned Utility 
Under the arrangements described under Step 2, the utility will be the main partner of the 
mining company and associated IPPs, and therefore its financial health and 
creditworthiness is essential to such efforts, and will determine the range of possible 
arrangements which the mines and the private sector will be willing to engage in.  
When acting as an offtaker of power, there should be enough credibility in the utility’s 
ability to distribute this power to consumers with a sustained ability to pay for the power. 
For many African countries, participation in a regional power pool can help matters, 
reducing the financial risk to the utility and therefore such power investments because 
excess supply will have an immediate outlet for sale into the regional energy market.  
 
Questions:  
 
- Is the utility sufficiently robust, credible and creditworthy to act as a partner to 
the mines and associated IPPs? 
- If not, what are the main constraints which are undermining the health of the 
utility? 
- Is an adequate reform process underway to ensure the financial health and 
capacity of the utility in future? 
 
c. Planning framework 
Few countries have explicitly incorporated the power demands and investment plans of the 
mining sector into their power master plans for the country. This has led to inadequate 
national transmission grids. The grid may be insufficient with respect to its coverage, or its 
capacity to transmit power. Many mines operate in remote areas not reached by the grid 
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infrastructure which necessitates additional investment. Low and medium voltage systems are 
inadequate to transmit the high voltage power needed or sold by mining companies. Even 
where high voltage systems are in place, if these have not been well maintained, additional 
restoration work may be necessary before additional industrial supply can be managed. In 
Guinea, the lack of a strong, efficient transmission system explains why mines are self-
generating. In the DRC, poor transmission links in the Katanga region led to collaboration 
between the mines and the public utility to upgrade the links.
63
 Similarly, there are also 
situations whereby the transmission network is not adapted to carry the load that mines could 
sell back to the grid. For instance in Mozambique, Vale and Rio Tinto designed coal-fired 
power plants with a capacity to sell 100MW to the local grid and 290MW to the South 
African Power Pool but given the bottlenecks in infrastructure and the delay in construction 
of the backbone grid, only 50MW from those plants would be evacuated.
64
  
 
In many African countries, master plans are outdated, rigid, and do not reflect changes in 
price and availability of fuel and equipment and the resulting least-cost arrangements, let 
alone the mining synergies.   
 
This situation might be improved under the following conditions: 
- If the ministry of energy and mining are housed under the same ministry, as is the 
case in Tanzania, Mauritania and Cameroon. 
- If the private sector is brought into partnership with the government to develop 
large hydropower and other generation projects through a specialised entity, such 
as the Office for the Promotion of Private Power Investment (OPPI)  in Zambia. 
- If the mines and other big users of power are involved in planning how best to 
exploit the country’s hydropower resources, facilitated by the recently formulated 
Electricity Law, such as in Cameroon. The new legal framework requires private 
developers to compete for hydro sites, except where the site is to be allocated to a 
mine for the development of power for its own needs.  In this case the law 
requires the generation of surplus electricity which is to be sold to the grid at cost 
recovery tariffs, all to be determined by the regulator as explained in the box 
below.  
 
In a Policy Letter signed by the Prime Minister, dated February 17, 2012, the 
Government of Cameroon committed itself to develop all secondary legislation 
under the 2011 Electricity Law in consultation with stakeholders.  In particular 
this secondary legislation will stipulate the principles to be used for determining 
the quantity of electricity allocated to the public grid and it will include i) 
domestic supply and demand projections, ii) preference for supply to domestic 
consumers ahead of industrial consumers or export of electricity, iii) existing 
arrangements between auto‐producers and the public grid concessionaire, iv) the 
physical characteristics of the site and v) electricity demand of the auto‐
producer.
65
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Such policy planning and sector coordination is especially required when:  
 
- the government’s intention is to attract IPPs using mining demand as an anchor 
for such investments, but with the objective of off-taking part of the IPP’s power 
to also serve other user demand; and  
- the government’s intention is to tap into the high voltage bulk power lines that 
mines might build to access the grid: in this case, significant additional 
infrastructure would be necessary (substations, transformers) in order for the 
power supply to step down to a voltage level which can be used by small-scale 
industrial or agricultural users.  In addition, for such smaller-scale users to access 
the grid supply, an active utility is required to install distribution infrastructure, 
monitor usage, and collect payments in these areas.  
 
Given the exposure to risks and the capital expenditure involved in both of these 
undertakings, anticipation of and planning for potential demand is necessary. 
 
Planning for power and mining synergies, however, is sometimes relegated to second 
place when the “pit-to-port” transport logistics of mining operations is a constraint. For 
example, in Guinea and Mozambique, the expansion of iron ore mining and coking coal 
exports is constrained much more by transport constraints than by electricity concerns. 
 
Questions:  
- Is the Power Master Plan integrating the growth of the mining demand for 
energy? 
- Does the government have in place coordination platforms with the mining 
sector? 
- Has the government anticipated the growth in energy demand and the 
possibility to meet this demand by leveraging generation and transmission 
infrastructure put in place to serve the needs of the mine? 
- Are infrastructure constraints impeding progress in the realization of mine-
power synergies? Can these constraints be overcome? 
- For transmission infrastructure, is there a role for donors to play in funding 
transmission lines/reinforcement projects? (e.g. World Bank’s Inga to 
Kasumbalesa transmission line reinforcement project in DRC
66
) 
- Does the necessary commercial framework exist for the mining 
companies/private sector to fund the transmission and recoup the 
investment? 
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STEP 4: Negotiating points 
 
 Necessary Preconditions Negotiating Points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mines +Rural 
Electrification 
 
 
 
 
 Contractual requirement for mines to participate in 
rural electrification initiatives. 
 Coordination between mining companies and 
donor/government/NGOs. 
 Clear framework articulating responsibilities of each 
party. 
 Capacity of each party to carry out their role. 
 Presence of local government/utility in rural areas.  
 Effective demand/willingness to pay for power in 
communities. 
 
 
 Is this part of a mining company’s CSR initiatives or is it to be a 
contractual obligation (developing model concession agreements 
mandating the provision of electricity within a certain radius 
would increase certainty for investors, put all mining companies 
on an equal footing in their corporate social responsibility 
programs, and increase the accountability of government as the 
contract enforcement authority
67
) 
 Which parties will be involved (government, utility, donors, 
NGOs)? 
 What are the responsibilities of each party? 
 How will the initiative be sustained after the mine leaves? 
 Is there a need to give a financial incentive to ensure a more 
sustainable initiative from the mine? If so, the subsidies currently 
used for social tariffs might be reoriented to support a mini-grid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mines + 
Excess Supply 
 
 
 Liberalized power market with clear legislative and 
regulatory framework for private sector power 
producers 
 Excess capacity built in at design phase of power plant 
project. 
 Commercially viable offtake agreement between 
company and utility 
 Credible state-owned utility, if acting as offtaker,  
 Adequate transmission infrastructure to offtake and 
distribute power 
 
 How much excess power should be mandated e.g. a certain % 
excess power above the mines planned plant size?   
 Is there scope for coordination, resource pooling and joint 
strategy among the different mining companies operating in the 
region? 
 What are the terms of the Power Purchase Agreement (Power 
Price, Length of Agreement)? Power purchase agreement must 
be commercially viable for mining company as well as 
affordable to utility. 
 Is the public utility a viable partner? Mining company may 
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 Demand for excess power (national or as part of 
regional power pool) 
 
demand additional security if utility is not sufficiently 
creditworthy (e.g. sovereign guarantee, MIGA insurance, escrow 
accounts, letters of credit) 
 At what point does the offtake occur? Who is responsible for 
transmission and distribution of power? Is there sufficient 
demand for this excess power in the national/regional market? 
 If at negotiation/feasibility study stage, conditions are not yet in 
place to distribute power, can the power plant be designed and 
constructed so that it can be expanded on a commercially 
feasible basis? 
 What will become of the infrastructure when the mine ceases 
operations? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mines as an 
anchor for 
IPPs  
 
 
 
 Liberalized power market with clear legislative and 
regulatory framework for IPPs.  
 Sufficient IPP power supply to meet mining demand as 
well as excess supply for national grid. 
 Sufficiently low cost and reliable power supply 
anticipated (vis-à-vis current self-supply arrangement) 
to incentivise mining company to act as offtaker. 
 Power plant to be available to fit with mine’s planned 
timetable. Other mine logistics (rail, port) not likely to 
delay mining project and thus mining power demand. 
 Investment in transmission infrastructure to supply 
power to mine site. 
 Utility to act as a credible partial offtaker of power 
from IPP.  
 
 
 What structure will this investment take – will the mine simply 
act as an offtaker, or participate actively as a member of a joint 
venture in the IPP investment? 
 Is the timeframe for commissioning the power plant in line with 
the mining operations? What provisions will be made for delays 
in power availability? Have risk assessments and default 
possibilities been sufficiently taken into account? Are 
completion guarantees and operating guarantees necessary? 
 How much of the generated power will the mine offtake? 
(Balance between mining needs and supply to national grid) 
 What are the terms of the Power Purchase Agreement (Power 
Price, Length of Agreement)? Do the terms vary between mine 
and utility? 
 How will the PPA be structured i.e. single party PPA with 
complete offtake and redistribution by utility vs. multiparty PPA 
from IPP to individual end users? 
 Is the public utility a viable partner? IPP may demand additional 
security if utility is not sufficiently creditworthy (e.g. sovereign 
guarantee, MIGA insurance, escrow accounts, letters of credit)  
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 Is the mining company a viable partner? If not a multi-national 
company and significant country/project risk IPP may demand 
additional security if utility is not sufficiently creditworthy (e.g. 
escrow accounts, letters of credit) 
 Who will be responsible for transmission and distribution of 
power, both to the mines and to the utility? 
 What provisions can be made for when the mine ceases 
operations? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mines source 
from Grid 
 
 Sufficient and reliable national power supply to meet 
demand. 
 Cost of power sufficiently low to disincentivize mining 
company from self-supply, but sufficiently high to 
enable utility to achieve cost recovery (covering capital 
and operating costs) 
 Transmission infrastructure in place to supply mine or 
extension as a manageable investment. 
 Management of mine’s power demand so as not to 
saturate the national grid. 
 Commercial frameworks in place to incentivize mines 
to participate in or fund upgrade of transmission 
infrastructure and development of national power 
generation capacity.   
 
 Who will be responsible for transmission and distribution of power 
to the mines? 
 If transmission infrastructure is financed by the private sector, will 
ownership be transferred to the utility? How will investment be 
recovered? 
 How can the transmission design ensure that minimal additional 
investment in distribution infrastructure can allow smaller users to 
tap into grid supply? 
 How will mines contribute to ensuring that their power demand does 
not overburden the grid?  
o In exchange for priority access in the event of load shedding, 
what can mines provide in terms of additional generation 
capacity to expand the grid supply? E.g. investment in extra 
emergency power infrastructure, making available the idle 
capacity of their emergency generators. 
o Can a margin be charged on the power tariff for the mines to 
facilitate the utility’s investment in additional power 
generation and transmission infrastructure? 
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Framework 3 
Shared Use in the context of Water 
 
Introduction 
 
To meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of halving the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking water
68
 and basic sanitation by 2015, the African 
Infrastructure Country Diagnostic estimates that the 48 states in Sub-Saharan Africa would 
collectively needed to have been spending approximately US$16.5 billion on water infrastructure 
per year between 2006 and 2015. This far exceeds the current estimated annual spend of US$3.6 
billion.
69
 While operational inefficiencies, poorly targeted subsidies and underpricing of water 
supply services account for part of the reason that the MDGs will not be met, the overall 
financing gap for the water sector is still huge at an estimated US$7.8 billion a year.  
 
At the same time, water is also of critical importance in mining. Large volumes of water are 
required at each phase of the mining process to suppress dust, process and mine ore, cool and 
wash mining equipment, manage waste tailings, and for consumption by mining communities. 
Without water, a mine cannot operate.  Yet, mining companies increasingly find themselves 
operating in water stressed environments where there is a physical shortage of fresh water, or 
water availability for the mines is limited by regulation, and considerable investment in water 
infrastructure is required to ensure a reliable water supply for mining operations. Estimates 
suggest that the mining sector’s total annual expenditure70 on water-related infrastructure 
globally in 2011 was $7.7 billion.
71
 The most important sectors responsible for this growth in 
expenditure are water supply, reuse, metals recovery and effluent treatment. 
 
In addition, mines are frequently located in places where access to safe and reliable water 
services is inadequate to meet local community requirements. The perception that mines may be 
draining available water resources, or are polluting or altering the course of existing water 
                                                 
68
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sources can result in considerable social tensions with surrounding communities and result in 
operational disruptions. Mining companies are also coming under pressure to minimize the 
environmental impact of their water usage and effluent discharge, where not properly doing so 
can incur substantial reputational, regulatory, and operational costs.   
 
In this context, governments should ensure that mining-related investments in water 
infrastructure are aligned with the goals and interests of the communities in which they operate 
as well as to national development goals. On the one hand, this relates to water quality. 
Governments need to enact, monitor and enforce tight environmental regulations to require 
mining companies to minimize their ecological footprint. On the other hand, as [fresh] water 
sources become scarcer, whether as a result of climate change, low annual rainfall, water 
pollution, or increasing demands on available water sources, governments need to enact policies 
that oblige mining companies to minimize fresh water usage, maximize water re-use and 
recycling, and look to other water sources – such as seawater or sewage waste water, to meet 
their remaining water supply needs.  
 
To protect against such regulatory limitations on water allocations requires mines to invest in 
more efficient water management systems and consider the scope for shared use schemes. This 
framework addresses the scope for synergies between the water infrastructure needs of mines 
and the water supply needs of surrounding communities.  
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Key Definitions 
 
Acid Mine Drainage (AMD): a sulphuric acid that is formed when sulphur-bearing materials, 
such as pyrites in ground, come into contact with air and water. This often occurs in open pit 
mining when, for example, coal seams are excavated as well as from runoff or seepage from 
overburden or coal/ ore stockpiles. The presence of AMD increases the acidity (lowers the pH) 
of water and also has the ability to liberate heavy metals such as cadmium, antimony, arsenic, 
iron and dissolved solids such as calcium and sulphates, from the rocks it comes into contact 
with.
72
 
 
Beneficiation: the mechanical and chemical processes used to extract the desired product from 
ore (i.e. to improve its grade), the waste product of which is tailings.  
Dewatering:  The process of draining the water that collects in the open pits during the mining 
process. Water collects in the open pits when ore or coal is excavated below the water table, or 
from rainfall. 
Open pit (or strip) mining: a type of surface mining to extract ore or coal that lies up to 200m 
below the surface.
73
 In the case of coal, once the coal seam is exposed, it is drilled, fractured and 
systematically mined in strips.
 74
   
Overburden: the soil and rock which are excavated from open pits to reach a coal seam or mine 
ore.  
 
Surface run-off: runoff of waste water from the overburden due to rain or flooding 
Tailings: the waste stream of ground rock and process effluents (including unrecoverable and 
uneconomic metals, minerals, chemicals, organics and process water) that are generated in a 
mine processing plant during beneficiation. Tailings are usually discharged, normally as slurry, 
to a final storage area commonly known as a Tailings Management Facility (TMF) or Tailings 
Storage Facility (TSF).
75
 
Water scarcity: Water scarcity relates to the availability of clean water. Water scarcity can 
occur even in areas where there is plenty of rainfall. Flooding, which is normally associated with 
excessive water availability, can also result in water scarcity to the extent it contaminates clean 
water sources or disrupts the treatment of water when waste water treatment facilities are overrun 
with water.  How water is conserved, used and distributed in communities, as well as the quality 
of the water available, can determine if there is enough to meet the demands of households, 
farms, industry and the environment. 
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 “Water Management: Waste not, want not,” Mining Magazine, July/ August 2010. 
73 I. Satyanarayana, “Basics of Open-pit mining”, March 13, 2012, available at www.slideshare.net/isnindian. 
74 World Coal Association website, “Coal,” available at: http://www.worldcoal.org/coal/coal-mining/. 
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STEP 1: Assessing the current situation: what is at stake? 
 
An important first step is to assess the availability of water resources and existing water 
infrastructure to supply water to - and treat water for the current and projected water users. In 
terms of water resources, information is required as to the available water sources and their 
renewability, i.e. the annual projected rainfall and/or recharge capacity of any underground 
aquifers, the current and projected demands on those water resources and the impact of the 
mining operations on those water resources in relation to their stated water requirements. In 
terms of a mining operation’s fresh water dependency, at the extremes, mining companies either 
source all their water from fresh water sources (underground or surface water), or from other 
sources (recycled water, seawater, waste water etc.) when no fresh water is available, or no water 
license has been awarded for fresh water usage. 
 
 
Questions to ask in relation to existing water resources and water infrastructure: 
 
- What are the available water resources? What is their annual renewability? (annual projected rainfall 
and/ or recharge capacity of aquifers ) 
- Who are the current and projected water users (including the surrounding community and the mine)?  
- How much water does the mining operation require and how is the mining company planning to 
obtain water for its operations? 
- What is the existing water infrastructure? 
 
In relation to the water infrastructure, an assessment of the existing water supply and treatment 
situation needs to be made and whether, to the extent such water infrastructure exists, it can or 
should support a mining operation’s water requirements. At the extremes in relation to water 
supply infrastructure, mining operations are either completely self-sufficient in terms of having 
their own self-constructed or rehabilitated water infrastructure from which to source [and treat]
76
 
water, or are able to obtain water and/or have waste water treated by a local authority.  
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From water sources using own infrastructure 
 
From local water authority 
 
 
 
 
No, or limited existing water distribution 
infrastructure at location of mine area, or 
unreliable supply: 
 Insufficient water infrastructure to meet 
local water supply demand, let alone 
industrial use. 
 Unreliable supply due to poor 
management of water infrastructure, or 
power outages (where electricity required 
to power water pumps).
77
 
 
Good existing water infrastructure: 
 Sufficient, reliable water supply from 
existing water distribution network. 
 Reliable [and creditworthy] water 
authority to supply water to the mine site 
and/ or treat residential waste water from 
mining community.  
Abundant water sources from nearby 
source without cost (or notional charge) 
 
Low cost of water: 
 Cost of sourcing water from and/or 
having waste water treated by public 
authority is lower than building own 
infrastructure to source water. 
 Transparent water tariff where pass 
through costs are known or fixed. 
Lack of distribution infrastructure: 
 Distribution network does not extend to 
mines and the cost of extension is 
equivalent to, or greater than the cost of 
self-sourcing water.  
 
Low cost of connection to existing 
distribution network: 
 Distribution infrastructure extends to 
mining area, or investment required to 
connect to water supply which, on a cost-
benefit analysis, is positive taking into 
account the distance to the water 
distribution network and cost of sourcing 
own water.  
No operational or credible water authority 
in the area. 
Water authority as credible partner for 
offtake agreement. 
                                                 
77
 Reliable water supply is crucial for mining operations – particularly for mining water-intensive commodities such 
as copper or gold. 
 
Where do mining companies 
obtain water from and how? 
 
Why? 
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Where mining companies source their own water for mining operations, the water source will 
depend on the water demand of the mine, the availability of water resources, government 
regulation, and corporate policies: 
 
a. Water demand – Some minerals tend to be more water intensive than others, as 
is illustrated by the table on the next page from a 2011 Frost & Sullivan study. 
However, with the increasing reliance on low-grade ores, harder-to-reach mineral 
deposits and the mining of tailings, mining is generally becoming more intensive in 
its overall water requirements.
78
 This is because water use is a function of the volume 
of ore extracted rather than the weight of the finished product sold.
79
With a low grade 
product, to generate the same amount of finished product it is necessary to invest in 
more water infrastructure.
80
 
 
b. Availability of fresh water resources – where water resources are abundant, and/or 
there is little or no regulation requiring otherwise, mining companies may obtain all, 
or a large part of their water from fresh water sources. By contrast, when water 
sources are scarce, or limited fresh water is available to the mining company, it will 
be required to limit its use of water and/ or to seek alternative water sources.
81
 
 
c. Law – Legislation plays an important role in regulating where companies source their 
water and how efficiently water is managed. Strict environmental regulations and a 
water licensing regime that only allocates limited water rights to fresh water sources 
to a mining company may require it to seek alternative sources, to re-use/ recycle 
water, and to implement more efficient water management systems that require less 
water in the mining process. 
 
d. Corporate policy – Large-scale mining heavy weights such as Vale, Anglo 
American, ArcelorMittal, and Rio Tinto have internal policies on water management 
and usage that are implemented to varying degrees across their global operations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Water intensity of key mineral and Metals (Frost and Sullivan – 2011) 
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 “Mining a rich seam for water companies,” Global Water Intelligence, Vol. 12, Issue 7 (July 2011), available at: 
http://www.globalwaterintel.com/archive/12/7/general/mining-rich-seam-water-
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 “Mining a rich seam for water companies”, Global Water Intelligence, op cit. 
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 “Mining a rich seam for water companies”, Global Water Intelligence, op cit. 
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 Even in water abundant countries like Liberia, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone, lack of adequate water storage, 
treatment, and supply infrastructure means that water sources are unevenly distributed and not always available 
throughout the country, particularly during the dry season. Potable drinking water is also limited.  
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STEP 2: Identifying the operational synergies  
 
Across the spectrum from mines operating in an enclave and sourcing their own [fresh] water to 
mines fully integrated with the water infrastructure constructed and managed by a water 
authority, there is the potential to leverage the mining industry’s capital investments in water 
infrastructure for the development of water infrastructure at a local level to meet the drinking 
water needs of communities.  
 
This section explores three scenarios for leveraging mining-related investments in water 
infrastructure for development: First, where a mining company expands the capacity of its 
infrastructure – either at the design phase, or during an expansion of its operations, to supply 
treated water to surrounding communities. Second, where a mining company acts as an anchor 
for investments in off-site water infrastructure which will then supply and/or treat both the water 
requirements of the mining company(ies) and other users. Third, where a mining company 
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sources its own water, but agrees to collaborate with other stakeholders to rehabilitate, extend, or 
construct required water infrastructure for surrounding communities.  
 
a. Mines and excess supply of water: leveraging mines for increased drinking water 
 
Alternative sources of water for mining operations can come from (1) dewatering, (2) 
desalination and (3) mine, or residential waste water. 
 
Mines supply excess treated water from dewatering 
 
As mining companies excavate deeper below ground water levels to extract ore and mineral 
deposits, water ingress poses an increasing challenge. For active mines, water that collects in 
the mine pits – whether it be from rainfall, mining activities, or ground water– needs to be 
drained (“dewatered”) and carefully stored to continue mining activities and ensure that mine 
waste in this water does not contaminate ground and surface waters. There is the opportunity 
to mitigate the costs of dewatering and treat dewatered water through collaboration with 
other mining companies, local authorities, or other water offtakers, at the same time 
supplying water to local communities.   
 
Example: eMalahleni Water Reclamation Plant in South Africa  
 
 Anglo American’s Thermal Coal workings, located in the Witbank coalfields, located 
around the city of eMalahleni, contain approximately 140,000 megaliters of excess ground 
water that need to be drained from the excavation pits to continue mining. This water poses 
serious challenges to the active mines, but more so in closed mines, where without adequate 
management, the mine water can contaminate groundwater sources. At the same time, the 
region surrounding eMalahleni is a highly water stressed area with sporadic rainfall and flash 
flooding when it does rain. eMalhahleni local municipality (ELM) has also been struggling to 
meet the water needs of the local population.  
 
After a decade of research and development, Anglo American partnered with BHP Billiton 
pursuant to a joint investigation agreement to commission the eMalahleni Water Reclamation 
Plant (EWRP) in 2007. The plant is owned and operated by Anglo American, treating water 
from three Anglo American Thermal Coal operations, while BJP Billiton procured a “right-
of-use” of the EWRP to treat water from its South Witbank Colliery on the basis of shared 
operating costs. In addition, Anglo American negotiated with the ELM to deliver treated 
water from the plant into the local municipality’s drinking water system.  
 
Using the latest in water purification technology, it is currently desalinating record 
production volumes of 23 megaliters of water to potable quality per day, 18 megaliters of 
which is pumped directly into the ELM’s reservoirs, meeting some 20% of its daily water 
requirements. 
 
Additional water is piped to Greenside, Kleinkopje and Landau collieries as well as various 
nearby Anglo Coal service departments for domestic use and for mining activities, such as 
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dust suppression. These operations are now self-sufficient in terms of their water 
requirements, which eases the serious supply problems of the local municipality.
82
 
 
Given the capital costs associated with dealing with water ingress, there may be a business 
case for mining companies to collaborate in treating and re-using the water or supplying it to 
surrounding communities.  
 
Mines supply excess desalinated water 
 
Where mining companies are operating in highly water scarce areas, seawater may be the 
only viable option – even if it needs to be piped hundreds of kilometers to the mine site. This 
requires a huge capital investment from mining companies that includes not only a seawater 
desalination project, but also a high pressure conveyance pipeline to supply the seawater to 
the site and an energy transmission project to power the desalination plant, although solar-
powered desalination technology is starting to be rolled out.  
 
The direct cost for desalinated seawater supply has been estimated to vary between US$1 to 
US$4 per cubic meter of water, depending on the altitude and distance of the mining 
operations from the coast.
83
 This can represent between 3% and 20% of the total direct 
operational costs of a mining operation, providing a financial incentive to mines both to 
minimize their water requirements and to investigate joint collaborations to offset some 
costs.  
 
A scenario where a mining company is required to construct a desalination plant also 
presents the opportunity for it to provide potable, desalinated water to surrounding 
communities in partnership with a local water authority.  The incremental marginal cost of 
expanding the capacity of a desalination plant to provide additional water to communities 
may be relatively small to the mining company compared with the capital investment of 
financing the construction of a desalination plant. In some cases, such as with the mining 
company Areva’s former operations in Namibia, the Namibian government also required 
Areva to provide water.  
 
Example: Areva’s operations in Namibia 
 
After obtaining a mining license for the Trekkopje uranium mine in northwestern Namibia, 
Areva was required to construct a seawater supply and desalination plant to provide the mine 
with water given strict restrictions on water extraction from coastal aquifers. During this 
process, it collaborated with NamWater, the Namibian water authority, to distribute excess 
water from the desalination plant to the water short Erongo region.
84
  
 
 
                                                 
82WCA Case Study, “eMalahleni Water Reclamation Plant: South Africa,” World Coal Association, 2008, available 
at http://www.worldcoal.org/resources/case-studies/emalahleni-water-reclamation-plant/.  
83
 Raymond Philippe and Hubert Fleming, “Unearthing Efficient Mining Water Solutions,” Water World, op cit. 
84
 International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM), “Water management in mining: a selection of case studies” 
(2012), available at: http://www.icmm.com/www.icmm.com/water-case-studies. 
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Mines supply excess treated waste water  
 
Mining companies may be able to meet water needs by recycling their own waste water for 
re-use, or, more innovatively, the organic waste/ sewerage water of neighboring communities 
after some primary treatment, and then providing excess treated potable water back to 
communities. An example of this is the Cerro Verde copper and molybdenum mining 
operations of Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold in Arequipa, Peru, where a large 
wastewater treatment facility is under construction to meet the mining operation’s increased 
water needs when it expands its operations, while at the same time supplying excess water to 
a surrounding community.
85
 
 
Example: Waste water treatment plant for Arequipa – Cerro Verde expansion86 
 
Copper mining requires water to concentrate copper and to process it into cathode copper. 
The Cerro Verde expansion project, which will triple the mining operations’ extraction and 
processing of sulfide ore, will require an approximate 85% increase in its water requirements.  
 
In 2011, after conducting feasibility studies to evaluate the possibility of constructing a 
wastewater treatment plant to meet its additional water needs following the expansion of its 
operations, Cerro Verde entered into discussions with the Regional Government of Arequipa, 
the national government, SEDAPAR (the local utility) and other local institutions to allow 
Cerro Verde to finance the engineering and construction of this treatment plant as part of its 
mine expansion plans. The plant will be operated by SEDAPAR and is expected to treat 
wastewater from the city of Arequipa, improve the water quality of the Rio Chili and provide 
a clean supply of water for the agricultural sector in the region. Construction began in 2013. 
 
 
b. Mines as an anchor for investment in water supply, storage and treatment 
infrastructure: leveraging mines for increased water supply 
 
Local governments or water authorities can use mining companies as anchor customers to attract 
investment for water infrastructure investments given the generally large water requirements of 
mining operations. From a government perspective, a long offtake agreement with a credible and 
credit-worthy mining company may help to secure financing where (1) the local government is 
institutionally weak, (2) subsidized water tariffs mean that cost recovery is negative, and (3) it is 
difficult to obtain reliable data to project consumer demand: 
 
i. Weak institutional capacity of local government/ water authority 
 
                                                 
85
 International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM), “Water management in mining: a selection of case studies” 
(2012), available at: http://www.icmm.com/www.icmm.com/water-case-studies. See also: “Cerro Verde Facts: 
Cerro Verde Expansion,” Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold (July 2011), available at: www.fcx.com; and Greta 
Bourke, “Freeport expects to start construction of US$4bn Cerro Verde expansion in 2013”, BNAmericas, July 19, 
2012. 
86
 Ibid. 
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Where the local government entity/ water authority is weak, financiers may be 
reluctant to provide the necessary financing without some comfort that it is 
sufficiently capable of managing the water supply or treatment services in a manner 
that maximizes cost-recovery and minimizes operational inefficiencies and losses.  
 
ii. Water tariff 
 
Financiers require some certainty that the net revenues of the water authority will be 
sufficient over the tenor of the loan to repay them.  This may not be the case where 
the water tariff is below the cost recovery level due to water subsidies. In such a 
scenario, financiers may be unwilling to provide financing, or will require some form 
of guarantee or credit support to become comfortable with the country risk they are 
taking in relation to the water subsidy. Such guarantees can be expensive for 
governments to source, particularly when they have a low country rating. 
  
iii. Consumer demand 
 
Financiers require reliable data on water consumption in relation to the water 
infrastructure they will be financing.
87
 Such data may be a challenge to obtain in a 
developing country context, particularly where census figures are not regularly 
updated, there is a high economic and social mobility, and many future users of water 
infrastructure may presently be obtaining their water directly from boreholes and 
other underground or surface water sources.  
 
Securing a mining company as an offtaker with predictable annual water requirements could 
mitigate each of these challenges by providing an anchor demand for water supply projections 
and improving cost recovery where the subsidies charged to (poorer) residential consumers are 
offset by the higher, unsubsidized water tariffs charged to the mining company.  
 
In turn, mining companies will consider entering into offtake agreements with a water authority 
in anticipation of an upgrade/ expansion/ extension of existing water infrastructure if the 
proposed water infrastructure: (1) reduces the cost of constructing water infrastructure in an 
enclave model or sourcing water elsewhere, (2) a reliable water supply can be guaranteed, and 
(3) they have certainty of the tariff they will be charged:  
 
1. Reduces costs  
 
There may be cost savings to be had if mining companies collaborate with a local 
authority and/ or other stakeholders to upgrade/ expand/ extend existing water 
infrastructure.  
 
2.   Reliability of supply - step-in rights 
                                                 
87
 This includes estimates on the size of the population, the coverage area and the average water consumption of the 
population, which is obtained from data on household water consumption based on population census information 
relating to the number of members in a household, the size of the house and the number of toilets and showers etc. 
Source: Interview with Bigen, South Africa, September 30, 2013. 
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Step-in rights may address mining companies’ concerns about the water authority’s 
ability to provide a continuous and reliable water supply. These rights provide a 
mechanism by which the mining company is allowed to step into the shoes of the 
water authority and take over the water supply where certain pre-agreed supply 
parameters are not met. These step-in rights would need to be negotiated with both 
the local government/ water authority as well as any financiers, given that the latter 
also generally require step-in rights where they are providing financing on a project-
finance basis. 
 
3.  Certainty of water tariff 
 
Mining companies strongly resist attempts to include a variable pass through charge 
for unrestricted capital investments in water infrastructure over and above the 
existing water infrastructure. A transparent pass through variable, capped as a 
percentage or otherwise indexed, can alleviate these concerns and therefore allow 
local authorities to leverage their off-take agreements with mining companies to 
cross-subsidize the capital and operational charges of supply water to low-income 
households up to a certain level. Donor-funding could also be sought for any scheme 
to extend and upgrade the water infrastructure and distribution network.  
 
c. Mines and supply to communities: leveraging mines for provision of potable water 
to rural communities  
 
- Constructing piped water supply, treatment and storage infrastructure for communities 
where such water infrastructure is not required for the mining company’s own operations 
 
In the situation where mines are sourcing their own water and/ or have no need for an on-site 
water treatment facility,
88
 but surrounding communities have limited access to safe drinking 
water, opportunities exist for rehabilitating, expanding, or replicating the self-supply options to 
surrounding peri-urban or rural locations. Such water infrastructure investment could also be 
mandated in the mining concession itself, or be negotiated as part of a CSR program. 
 
Example: Rio Tinto upgrading and rehabilitating water supply systems in Fort Dauphin, 
Madagascar  
 
Fort Dauphin in Madagascar has a population of around 50,000 people, but its water 
infrastructure is in disrepair and around 90% of the population does not have ready access to 
potable water. The water requirements for Rio Tinto-owned QMM Madagascar Minerals SA 
(QMM)’s mineral sands project, and the expected growth of the town due to the project 
development cannot be supported by the existing infrastructure.   
 
While QMM is able to contribute funds and engineering expertise to the upgrade and 
improvement of Fort Dauphin’s water infrastructure, it is not a sustainable solution for the region 
                                                 
88
 Some mining companies provide bottled water to mining communities rather than treating water to meet drinking 
water standards. Such mines generally have low water requirements for their processes (See Section D). 
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for it to perform the role of a water service provider to the town. QMM therefore initiated a 
consultative process resulting in a collaborative partnership with the World Bank and JIRAMA, 
the local service provider, to upgrade and extend the town supply and reticulation.  
 
Under the agreement the town supply line is being replaced, with a new treatment plant being 
constructed by QMM. The World Bank will assist with both financing and engineering to 
upgrade the town’s reticulation and distribution network, and operation by JIRAMA has been 
formally agreed. QMM will also assist with the training and management of the treatment 
facilities.
89
 
 
 
- Providing self-contained, small-scale water supply and treatment solutions as part of a CSR 
program  
 
Where water supply infrastructure is non-existent or defunct, mining companies may be more 
inclined to provide low cost water technology solutions where they can fund the initial 
capital cost of the water supply or treatment system, but do not need to operate or maintain, 
or necessarily commit to financing the operation and maintenance of the system.  
 
 Investment in low-cost water supply technologies such as boreholes with hand 
pumps and wells 
 
Mining companies operating in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique and other sub-
Saharan African countries regularly supply low cost water supply technologies such 
as boreholes with hand pumps and wells to local communities, in collaboration with 
such communities, as part of their CSR programs.  
 
Three concerns have been identified with such programs, which need to be addressed: 
 
 Water quality – monitoring of water required to ensure it is not contaminated 
with mine waste or, in the case of wells, high in bacteria and other pathogens that 
are harmful for human consumption. 
 Maintenance of technology – community capacity must be built to be able to 
own and maintain the technology. Experience from London Mining in Sierra 
Leone shows that such technologies can fall into disrepair if the community buy-
in and capacity is not there to maintain the technology. 
 Seasonal variability of water sources – water may not be available from such 
water points throughout the year. Mining companies need to ensure that the 
availability of ground sources has been considered, preferably in collaboration 
with the relevant water authority or NGOs providing water services in the area, 
before boreholes and wells are constructed.  
  
 Self-sufficient water treatment facilities  
 
                                                 
89
 Rio Tinto, “Rio Tinto and Water,” available at: www.riotinto.com/documents/reportspublications/rtandwater.pdf. 
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Innovative water treatment solutions that can be carried out in a stand-alone and 
sustainable manner are also being developed that can be implemented in collaboration 
with local government or private sector partners or NGOs. For example, the NGO 
Waterhealth International
90
 has developed the technology to provide water treatment 
systems that, once the initial capital cost of the infrastructure has been made, can be 
run sustainably for around 25 years on the basis of a water tariff that comprises the 
operating and maintenance costs of treating the water.  
 
Any CSR program for the supply of water points or treatment facilities should be done in 
collaboration with communities and local partnerships with NGOs, donors, and local 
authorities to ensure that such schemes have community buy-in, are sustainable without 
continued involvement of the mining company beyond the initial capital investment, and fit 
into local and national development goals for the provision of safe drinking water.  
 
Such a strategy would increase the company’s social license to operate in these areas, and 
assist the government in meeting their goals of drinking water supply in rural areas. 
 
 
STEP 3: Verifying the necessary preconditions 
 
The following pre-conditions need to be addressed or progressed to facilitate synergies 
between mining companies’ water – and water infrastructure - needs and national water 
development goals. 
 
a. Legal and regulatory framework 
Environmental and water regulations should enforce a zero tolerance policy on 
environmental waste and discharge of mine effluents, and limit the quantities and 
sources of fresh water that mining companies can extract, in order to prevent a strain 
on available fresh water sources or contamination and alteration of the course or flow 
rate of existing water sources.   
  
i. Strict environmental regulations – international standards, strict 
penalties 
 
Strict environmental regulations are required that hold mines to best 
environmental practices in relation to effluent discharge, tailings storage, 
ingress water, the use of chemicals in mining processing, and mine closure. 
There should also be strict penalties for environmental degradation and 
contamination of water sources, both during the mining operations and for a 
period of time after mine closure. 
 
ii. Water licensing regime 
 
                                                 
90
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There needs to be a clear legal and regulatory framework for the allocation of 
water rights among competing users.   Mining companies should be required 
to apply for a water license that is separate from the land that forms part of a 
mining concession. The allocation of water should be made on the basis of 
clear and transparent criteria, with the overriding objective of minimizing a 
mining company’s fresh water usage and incentivizing the mining company to 
maximize water recycling and re-use. 
 
At a minimum a water rights regime should: 
I. clarify how water will be allocated among competing users; 
II. ensure that water allocations to mines take into account (1) the 
availability of water resources, (2) the cumulative effect of water use 
in space and time, and (3) the mining operations’ ability to minimize 
its water use by implementing more efficient water management 
systems and recycling water; 
III. provide for a transparent system of granting and evaluating water 
licenses, including how the water tariff is calculated; and  
IV. provide for a mechanism to adjust the allocation of water rights over 
the life of the mining concession with a built in review mechanism.  
 
b. Ensure institutional setting that enforces and monitors water rights is in place 
It is fundamental to ensure that an institutional setting that enforces and monitors 
water rights is in place. 
 
i. Clear information  
 
To make informed decisions, the following types of information are required: 
 
 Hydrological data on the location, variability, and renewability of existing 
water resources to properly understand the existing water sources, any 
seasonal fluctuations in water availability, and anticipated climatic changes 
during the life span of the mine 
 User demands in relation to existing water resources  
 Analysis of cumulative effects of water users on water source during the life 
of a mine 
 Baseline study of water quality from which to monitor changes in water 
 
In some cases, the mining company may take the initiative to increase 
investments in technology to improve monitoring and transparency. Investment in 
infrastructure to monitor water quality may avoid contamination and future 
liabilities and can improve the relations of the company with local communities. 
 
ii. Coordination among government ministries and agencies 
 
In order to build the institutional setting, one of the most important requirements, 
but also one of the biggest challenges faced by governments, is the coordination 
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of different specialized agencies, authorities and ministries. Mining companies 
negotiating large-scale mining projects involving the building of water 
infrastructure must coordinate with the ministries/authorities responsible for the 
following:  
 
 allocating water among competing users; 
 financing the construction of, owning and operating & maintaining water 
infrastructure; 
 providing drinking water & sanitation; and  
 the environment, 
 
to ensure that mining-related investments in infrastructure are aligned with, and 
leverage, national and local development goals in relation to ensuring a reliable 
and potable source of drinking water to communities.    
 
iii. Institutional capacity to monitor water usage and compliance with 
environmental best practices 
 
The relevant ministries/agencies need to have a workable level of human and 
financial capacity to monitor a mining company’s water and environmental 
footprint.  
 
iv. Institutional presence and capacity to supply water 
 
A credible local government authority is required for any sustainable public 
private partnership to occur in relation to shared use water infrastructure. In the 
absence of a local water authority, a mining company may be able to partner with 
an NGO or private sector water supplier to provide low cost water supply 
solutions that are community-led. However, it will be difficult to scale up such 
initiatives, or to leverage mining-related water investments in piped water 
infrastructure in such a scenario. 
 
Example: The Sierra Leone Water Company (SALWACO)  
 
SALWACO is responsible for the provision of water supply and water infrastructure 
outside of Freetown. However, its operation is currently limited to certain provincial 
capitals and secondary towns and is largely unreliable. A mining company is unlikely to 
consider relying on SALWACO, or a local authority where SALWACO is absent, to 
obtain or treat its water. Mines require certainty of water supply and cost, neither of 
which can be guaranteed under the current set up. 
 
c. Full cost recovery reflected in water tariff  
 
For any mining company initiative to be viable and sustainable a water tariff must be 
payable.  While full cost recovery may not always be feasible, given that certain 
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segments of the population are unable to pay, at a minimum, the water tariff should 
include the cost of operating and maintaining a water system. 
 
d. Sustainability of water infrastructure  
 
A mining company is unlikely to consider sharing any water infrastructure if it must 
carry out the operation and maintenance of a water system outside of the mining site 
once it has financed and/or procured the construction of water supply or water 
treatment facilities. In such a scenario, the only scope for the provision of water 
supply services by a mining company would be as part of its CSR policy, i.e. by 
financing low cost water supply and treatment technologies.  
 
Example: In Liberia, with the exception of the former mining towns such as the LAMCO 
town in Yekepa which has an old water piping system, no area outside of Monrovia has a 
water treatment and distribution network, let alone a functional one.  In the absence of a 
credible water authority or local partner able to operate and maintain water infrastructure, 
it is unlikely that a mining company would invest in a piped water supply system or an 
off-site water treatment facility. 
 
The sustainability of any mining-related water investment needs to be considered and 
addressed, particularly where the infrastructure needs to be operated and maintained. 
Three ways to promote stability are: 
 
I. Ensuring community buy-in – Any water infrastructure investment made for 
the benefit of a community must be carried out in continued consultation with 
representatives of the target community and other local stakeholders that have 
an interest in the provision and treatment of potable water in that community.   
 
II. Partnership with representatives from local government, or the water 
authority legally responsible for provision of water in that area to help 
build the institutional capacity to operate and maintain the water facility after 
mine closure. 
 
III. Community-led initiative to maintain and operate the facility – In the 
absence of a credible water authority, a local community could appoint a 
committee or local representatives to oversee the operation and maintenance 
of the water supply/ treatment system and collect a water tariff for water 
delivered that at a minimum covers the cost of operating and maintaining the 
system, or is otherwise subsidized by donor funding.  
 
Some NGOs and donor-led water and sanitation programs operating in rural 
areas build capacity in local communities to manage water supply and 
treatment systems. 
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STEP 4: Negotiating points  
 
This section considers points that may be raised during the negotiation of collaborative water arrangements between mining 
companies, the government, and/ or an NGO or private sector water utility. The list is not exhaustive, but sets out some initial 
questions to consider. 
 
 
Step 4: 
Negotiating 
Points 
Pre-conditions Negotiating Points 
Mines + 
Excess 
Supply 
 
 
 
 Excess capacity built in at design phase of desalination 
plant/ distribution network/ waste water treatment plant 
 Commercially viable off-take agreement between 
company and water authority. 
 Clear regulatory framework for agreement between 
mine and water utility 
 Water utility/ local authority as a credible off-taker 
 Adequate distribution infrastructure to supply water 
 
 How should minimum deliverable quantity of excess 
water be determined? 
 How will reliable supply of guaranteed amount of 
water be secured? 
 What will be the water charge that the public authority 
pays to the mining company for the water? 
 Who will own the infrastructure? 
 Who will operate and maintain the infrastructure?  
 Is the local/ water authority a viable partner? The 
mining company may require step in rights to seek 
comfort regarding reliability of service, or a guarantee 
that the local authority will pay for the provision for 
water services. 
 Who is responsible for the financing, construction, and 
maintenance of distribution network? 
 When the mine ceases operations what becomes of the 
infrastructure? 
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Mines as 
anchor for 
water 
demand to 
encourage 
investment 
 
 
 Mining company as a creditworthy offtaker 
 Water demand and consumption data for geographical 
area 
 Sufficient water supply to meet mining demand and 
domestic demand of surrounding communities. 
 Certainty of pass through costs (variable components) 
in the water tariff 
 Feasible investment for mining company to extend 
distribution infrastructure both to mine site and to 
surrounding communities previously not connected to 
water distribution system within a defined radius.  
 Legislation for public-private investment  
 
 Is the local/ public authority a creditworthy partner? If 
not, what kind of credit support will be required? Step 
in rights? 
 Is the timeframe for commissioning the water supply 
and distribution system in line with the mining 
operations?  
 What provisions will be made for delays/stoppages in 
water availability?  
 Who will construct distribution lines to the mine site? 
 If distribution, storage, and/ or water treatment 
infrastructure is privately financed, will ownership be 
transferred to the public authority?  
 Water tariff: What is the water tariff charged to the 
mining company? What are the pass through elements 
of the tariff? Mining companies will want certainty as 
to water costs. Will the full financing costs be reflected 
in the water tariff to the mining company? Financiers 
may also require debt service and financing costs to be 
treated as a pass through in the water tariff 
 
Mines + 
CSR 
 
 
 
 Partnership between mining companies and 
government/donor/NGOs 
 Motivation for mines to take part - contractual 
requirement or part of CSR initiative 
 Clear framework articulating responsibilities of each 
party 
 Is this part of a mining company’s CSR initiatives or is 
it to be a contractual obligation?
92  
 Do CSR proposals align with national development 
goals in relation to water and sanitation? 
 Which parties will be involved: Government (national/ 
local authorities, or water agency), donors, NGOs, 
private sector water provider? 
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 Capacity of each party to carry out its role 
 [Presence of local government/utility in rural areas]91  
 Effective demand/willingness to pay at least the 
operational and maintenance costs for water in 
communities 
 
 What are the responsibilities of each party? 
 What is the geographical area for which the CSR 
program will be provided? 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
92
 Developing model concession agreements mandating the provision of potable water within a certain radius would increase certainty for investors, put all 
mining companies on an equal footing in their corporate social responsibility programs, and increase the accountability of government as the contract 
enforcement authority. 
91 
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Framework 4 
Shared Use in the context of Information and Communication 
Technologies 
 
Introduction 
 
The contribution of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) to national 
development is widely recognized. While ICT products directly contribute to wealth creation, 
their use also contributes indirectly to economic development by empowering individuals to 
take advantage of new opportunities in sectors such as agriculture, health and education.
93
  
For instance, farmers use ICT to obtain information on prices for their produce and 
purchases. Yet, despite a positive general trend, estimates suggest that 1.1 billion households 
around the world are still unconnected, primarily in developing countries.
94
  As many as 16 
of the 24 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (accounting for 86% of the continent’s population) 
95
 lack access to a submarine cable.
96
  
 
ICT infrastructure is employed in all phases of a mine life because it increases efficiency and 
improves cost savings for the mining company. This can be through better logistics, allowing 
virtual operations, ore grade optimization and better exploration analyses. Instantaneous 
access to video, voice and data communications also provides the mining company with the 
ability to use materials and human resources more effectively, minimizing waste and time 
delays and strengthening logistical coordination. Finally, ICT can also help mitigate security 
risks and improve the safety of a mining company’s employees.97  In the absence of ICT 
infrastructure, mining companies would be subject to communication delays and reliant on 
costly satellite phones. 
 
However, as this framework explains, by capitalizing on the mining industry’s demand for 
ICT services, it is possible to both develop the national ICT infrastructure and increase 
coverage in remote areas where mining companies tend to operate. Effective coordination 
could even result in mining operations benefiting from considerable cost-savings. 
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 Panos London Policy Briefing: “ICTs and development in Zambia: challenges and opportunities,” October 
2010. 
94
 International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Press Release, “ITU releases latest global technology 
development figures,” February 2013. 
95
Vivien Foster “Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic - Overhauling the Engine of Growth: Infrastructure in 
Africa,” (2007) available at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/AICD_exec_summ_9-
30-08a.pdf. 
96
 Undersea cables carry most of international ICT traffic. The reasons are that their reliability is high and their 
carrying capacity is in the terabits per second, while satellites generally offer only megabits per second and 
display higher latency.  
97
 Perrine Toledano and Clara Roorda, “Leveraging mining demand and investment in ICT for broader needs.” 
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, Columbia University (June 2014) available at: 
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Key Definitions 
 
ICT infrastructure: refers to the types of network, such as telecommunications towers, 
antennae and fiber optic cable networks through which telecommunication is conveyed. 
 
ICT services: any form of signal or data transmission by means of a telecommunication 
network by a telecommunication company (e.g. wireless signals, telephone services, 
broadcasting).   
 
Broadband:  refers to the medium of wide bandwidth which can facilitate high-
speed data transmission of multiple data signals simultaneously. Broadband technology can 
be used across a large range of frequencies and data types. 
 
Different Internet Technologies used by the Mines 
 
Satellite: In remote areas, the cost of terrestrial solutions can be very high. Satellites provide 
an attractive option as they are able to cover a large geographic area at a relatively low and 
fixed cost. However, they also have less transmission capacity than terrestrial options such as 
fiber optic cables. The large distance between the satellite and users on earth can result in 
delays known as latency. Communications with the satellite take place via an earth station or 
individual antenna, the size and strength of which depends on the frequency being used. 
Large antennas are typically installed for high-bandwidth applications. Smaller antennas, 
such as Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) are more commonly used to satisfy lower-
bandwidth requirements. 
 
Microwave: Microwave systems use frequencies of between 6GHz and 38GHz), and involve 
point-to-point or point-to-multipoint broadband transmission. It is usually used to transport 
broadband data signals over relatively short distances (40–70 km, depending on the exact 
frequency used). A typical microwave system would involve the transmission of microwave 
communications between antennas placed on a series of telecommunications towers, using 
line of sight microwave radio technology. 
 
Fiber optic cable: Compared with the other technologies, fiber optic cable has a much higher 
capacity, providing very large bandwidth at very high transmission speeds. Fiber optic can 
also be used over great distances without electromagnetic interference, meaning it can be laid 
next to power-distribution cables.  
 
Copper: Copper wire is also used for long distance transmission, particularly where it is too 
expensive to replace copper cables with fiber optic. While, copper wire offers less capacity 
and slower transmission speeds than fiber optic cable, it can often be sufficient for low-traffic 
routes. 
 
 
 
STEP 1: Assessing the Current Situation - What is at stake? 
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An important first step is to assess the ICT arrangements which mining companies currently 
have in place, and why they chose this particular arrangement. At the extremes, mining 
companies are either completely self-sufficient, or their operations are fully integrated into 
the national ICT infrastructure. Arrangements in between these two options would involve a 
hybrid of national and self-provided infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-Provision of ICT Infrastructure & 
Services 
 
Using National Infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lack of ICT Coverage in remote mining 
areas 
Existing Coverage/Feasibility of coverage 
expansion to mining area. 
Unreliable Service  Reliable Service  
High Cost of national ICT Services  Low cost of services 
 
An assessment of the country’s infrastructure situation and institutional gaps is important 
when identifying the most realistic scenarios of ICT-mine synergies and the necessary steps 
to achieve them.  
 
STEP 2: Identifying operational synergies 
 
ICT service provision in remote areas where mines are often located is a challenge for 
telecommunications companies as the cost of building infrastructure and providing services 
to a small number of customers can be very high. As a result, in these areas of relatively low 
demand, infrastructure investment and service provision does not make economic sense for a 
private company.  It is in this backdrop that creating ICT -mine- synergies through the mines’ 
demand for ICT services becomes critical. These synergies can be realized whether the mines 
build their own infrastructure or not.  
 
Potential ICT-Mine Synergies  
Situations Categories 
 
1 - Mines build their own 
infrastructure 
a) Telecommunications company adds capacity to mine 
infrastructure to serve the communities. 
b) Mines build/facilitate additional telecommunications 
How do mines acquire ICT 
services? 
 
Why? 
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capacity. 
 
 
2 - Mines do not build 
infrastructure 
 
 
a) Mines as an anchor demand for telecommunications 
companies. 
b) Construction/utility companies build required infrastructure 
to serve mines (e.g.: power, pipeline and railways) and add 
telecommunication capacity at a lower cost. 
c) Government, telecommunications and mining companies 
coordinate efforts and investments. 
 
 
Category 1: Mining companies build their own ICT infrastructure 
 
It is important to note that in the context of ICT, due to the complexities of service provision, 
it is unrealistic to expect mines to provide both the infrastructure and services as part of a 
voluntary CSR initiative. While a mine could fund the capital cost of a satellite antenna for 
nearby communities, for example, it would remain necessary for telecom providers to then 
provide telecommunication services to the communities. Thus, the options below either 
present a commercial opportunity for the mines to benefit from the arrangements, or a need 
for regulations to mandate that the mines engage in shared access (to its  ICT infrastructure) 
arrangements.  
 
a. Telecommunications company adds capacity to mine infrastructure 
In the situation where there is no reliable ICT infrastructure in the area in which a mining 
operation is located, mining companies may choose to provide their own infrastructure.  In 
this case, opportunities may exist for expanding access to this infrastructure to enable 
telecommunications companies to provide ICT services to nearby communities at a lower 
cost.  
 
In remote and sparsely populated areas, it may not be economically viable for 
telecommunications companies to construct towers themselves, due to insufficient demand 
and high operational costs. For example, with regard to fiber optic networks, a study by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) indicates that around 
68% of the costs in the first year of extending the fiber optic network to the premises are 
related to civil works.
98
  
 
In these contexts, mining companies often install radio signaling systems or fiber optic 
networks along their grids, railroad tracks, or pipelines to improve the monitoring, efficiency 
and safety of their ICT infrastructure. This requires the mine to fund all, or a significant part 
of the installation costs of telecommunications towers or fiber networks. It then becomes 
economical for telecommunications companies to add telecommunication capacity to this 
infrastructure. While such a scenario has not been found in Africa to date, it is becoming 
more common on other continents. For instance, in Peru, Compania Minera Antamina 
(Antamina) built a US$2 million fiber optic network to carry information along its 304km 
copper and zinc concentrate slurry pipeline system to provide information and detect 
disturbances on the pipeline at every point along its length. Realizing that the optical fiber 
would make it easier to service the Huaylas and Conchucos areas with telecommunication 
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services, Antamina partnered with Telefonica del Peru to provide ICT services to nearby 
communities at a reduced cost.
99
 
 
In the example above, the mining company was willing to allow access to its infrastructure by 
a telecommunications company, perhaps driven by a motivation to maintain its social license 
to operate. Government policies of co-location, which prohibit the duplication of 
telecommunications infrastructure where existing infrastructure can co-host other operators, 
can mandate such infrastructure sharing arrangements, recognizing that mining companies 
may not always be willing to allow access to their infrastructure (see Section 3 and regulation 
on co-location from Liberia below).  
 
b. Mines Build Additional Telecommunications Capacity and Lease to 
Telecommunications 
Another possible situation is one where mining companies not only allow access to their 
infrastructure, but add extra telecommunication capacity to the infrastructure and lease it to a 
telecom company.   
 
There may be commercial motivations for the mine to do this, as leasing additional 
telecommunication capacity would create another source of revenue for its operations, at 
limited additional cost. In some cases, the prospect of high revenue has led mining companies 
to also enter the telecommunications market.  Once again, examples have not been found in 
Africa but on other continents. For instance, in 2001, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, a 
Brazilian mining company had a plan to create a new company, RailCom, that would offer 
telecommunications infrastructure through dark fiber optic cables along 10,000 km of rail 
lines in the Southeast and Northeast of the country at an investment of US$100 million, and 
lease it to telecommunications companies. Although this involved a large capital outlay, Vale 
expected a financial return of US$300 million in five years.
100
 
 
In most cases mining (and oil) companies have opted to partner with telecommunications 
companies, instead of building a new venture, to share costs and synergies. An illustration 
from the oil sector in Malaysia shows that the national oil company Petronas and the main 
telecommunications company of the country, Celcom have together built Celcom Petro 
Network to install a fiber optic network along the national gas pipeline to address the 
telecommunication needs of Petronas and lease the spare capacity to other mobile operators 
and corporate customers.
101
 Similar schemes are expected for the cable that will be installed 
along the planned Nigeria-Algeria pipeline.
102
 
 
While in many cases mining companies are driven by commercial motivations to lease 
telecommunications capacity, or enter the telecommunications market themselves, one should 
recognize that this may not always be the case. In many cases, a mining company may not be 
inclined to provide a service that falls far outside of the scope of its core activities. In this 
case, governments may opt to mandate an obligation for the provision of excess ICT capacity 
in the terms of the mining company’s concession agreement.  
 
Category 2: Mines do not build infrastructure  
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a. Mines as an anchor demand for telecommunications companies 
When there is a mining operation in remote, sparsely populated and unconnected areas, the 
mine could provide a sufficient level of guaranteed demand for ICT services to justify 
investment by telecommunications companies. 
 
Example: Mozambique – when mines serve as anchor demand 
In Mozambique, Ncondezi Coal entered into an agreement with Vodacom whom it 
considered to be the most reliable provider, for the provision of mobile phone service around 
its site. Vodacom constructed a telecom tower and installed a satellite, based on a minimum 
guaranteed demand from Ncondezi. This allowed Vodacom to expand its footprint in the 
area, enabling access by users in a 10km radius around the tower, and has generated 3000 
additional contracts with users who otherwise had extremely limited or no mobile phone 
coverage.
103
 
 
Under this arrangement, companies will sign a contract that will cover the telecommunication 
company’s costs of building and/ or extending the requisite ICT infrastructure. The cost may 
be split among the companies with the percentage depending on the amount of services being 
provided to the mining company and the potential additional market for the 
telecommunication company in the area.
104
 This arrangement would enable the mining 
company to receive essential ICT services and the telecommunication company to expand its 
subscriber base, all at a lower cost to both parties than if they had decided to do so on their 
own. 
 
In the event that the mine’s demand is not sufficient to generate a commercially viable deal, 
the government could take measures to strengthen the anchor demand. This might involve 
adding its own demand, or providing subsidies to subscribers in a remote, low-income area. 
Local governments could also coordinate demand from public administration institutions, 
local schools and health care facilities in order to create sufficient anchor demand.  
 
b. Utility/Construction companies building required infrastructure to mines (e.g. 
power, pipeline and railways) add telecommunication capacity at a lower cost 
 
Economies of scope exist when a range of products can be produced or services provided 
together at a cheaper price than each product is produced or service is provided on its own. In 
the context of a mining operation, such economies of scope will arise when the outputs of one 
type of infrastructure can be used as the inputs of another type of infrastructure. Therefore, it 
is important to recognize that sharing should be encouraged not only within the ICT sector, 
but also together with other infrastructure industries (such as power utilities, water and 
sewage pipelines, and railways). For example, as mentioned above, since a large part of the 
costs of building a fiber optic network are related to civil works, joint infrastructure 
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construction – such as laying ICT networks along railway tracks or water pipeline -- can 
result in important savings for the telecommunications companies.  
 
In remote mining areas, the cost savings of such infrastructure sharing may be significant 
enough to make telecommunication services economically viable. For example, in Canada 
the power utility FNEI was only able to provide telecommunication services to nearby 
communities at an affordable cost after a De Beers mine agreed to let the company use its 
electricity grid infrastructure to build a fiber optic cable.
105
  
 
Example:  Zambia – Capitalizing on power lines for ICT services 
In Zambia, power utility company Copperbelt Energy Corporation (CEC) has installed fiber 
optic cables on its power lines to increase the quality of its ICT infrastructure. The company 
has approximately 500km of optical fiber network connecting Zambia’s mines in the 
Copperbelt region. Significant spare capacity existed on this network, and as a result CEC 
asked for a license which allowed it to lease excess capacity to other entities. As a result, in 
2005 CEC became the first company in Zambia to offer broadband optical fiber services.
106
 
 
In order to ensure that such economies of scope are realized, the government will play a key 
role in identifying opportunities, as well as facilitating negotiations between 
telecommunications companies and mining companies/ mining infrastructure providers to 
allow access to the relevant infrastructure. For instance, as seen in Step 3, the government 
could pass regulations on mandatory access to “passive infrastructure” or could set up online 
information sharing platforms to inform stakeholders about opportunities for shared access. 
 
c. Government, telecommunications and mining companies coordinate efforts and 
investments 
Another possibility for an ICT-mine synergy is a situation where the mine demand in a 
remote region is sufficient to attract a government program to finance and facilitate ICT 
infrastructure provision. In Australia, the government is building ICT infrastructure across 
the country and selling wholesale services to internet and telephone providers. In particular, it 
is prioritizing the connection of remote areas where significant demand of mining operations 
may attract service providers.
107
  
 
However, the government may not always have the budget to provide ICT infrastructure, 
especially in developing countries. In addition, the timeframe of government investments in 
this sector might not be in line with that of the mining companies, who may want to expedite 
the construction of the infrastructure necessary for the commencement of their operations. In 
this context, there is scope for the government, the telecommunications company and the 
mining company to coordinate efforts to build the infrastructure together. It would enable the 
government to connect remote communities, a mining company to connect its mine and a 
telecommunications company to expand its subscriber base. This would be at a lower cost to 
all parties than if they decided to do on their own. 
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STEP 3: Verifying the necessary preconditions 
 
3A: What are the necessary preconditions for each potential ICT-mine synergy? 
Depending on the situation, the type of policy needed to incentivize the buildup of ICT 
infrastructure will vary. This section sets out the necessary legal, institutional and regulatory 
conditions, and then goes on to suggest a number of policy considerations which might 
facilitate the sharing of mines’ ICT infrastructure, and the use of mines as an anchor demand 
for investments by telecommunications companies.  
 
Necessary Regulatory Framework for ICT- Mining Synergies 
Situations Categories  
Pre-conditions 
Necessary regulatory 
framework 
 
 
 
1. Mines build 
their own 
infrastructure 
 
 
 
a) Telecommunications 
company adds capacity 
to mine infrastructure to 
serve the communities. 
 
 
 
 
Comprehensive and 
independent 
regulatory system. 
 
 
 
 
Collaborative 
environment 
between private and 
public stakeholders 
(mining company, 
telecommunications 
companies, 
government 
agencies). 
 
Open Access (possibility 
for third parties to use an 
existing network 
infrastructure)  
- Co-location 
 
b) Mines build/facilitate 
additional 
telecommunications 
capacity. 
 
 
Licensing facilitation and 
infrastructure sharing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Mines do 
not build 
infrastructure 
 
 
 
a) Mines as an anchor 
demand for 
telecommunications 
companies.  
 
Long term agreement and 
guarantee mechanisms. 
Government financial 
support if needed. 
 
b) Construction/utility 
companies build 
required infrastructure 
to serve mines (e.g.: 
power, pipeline and 
railways) and add 
telecommunication 
capacity at a lower cost 
 
 
 
Open access and 
Infrastructure Sharing 
Framework. 
c) Government, 
telecommunications and 
mining companies 
coordinate efforts and 
investments. 
 
 
PPP enabling environment. 
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3B: Are these preconditions in place? 
a. Legal, Institutional & Regulatory Framework: Setting the Basis for ICT-Mine 
Synergies 
 
i. Liberalized Market and Open Access Policy 
A prerequisite to effectively leverage the ICT demand of mining companies is a competitive 
telecommunications sector. Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa still have a monopoly over 
certain segments of their telecommunications sector (e.g. the mobile phone market in 
Ethiopia, or the international gateway in Sierra Leone).  
 
The trend in recent years has been the unbundling of the ICT services and liberalization of the 
market to encourage competition from private participants. Without a competitive market, the 
mines would be unable to enter to extend services to a wider coverage area and would be 
forced to coordinate with potentially inefficient monopoly partners, limiting the incentives to 
leverage ICT infrastructure.  
 
In addition, a policy of open access available on transparent, non-discriminatory terms, and at 
fair prices is a necessary pre-condition for sharing infrastructure.  
 
ii. Regulatory Framework: Encouraging Mine Participation 
Regulatory Capacity: For private participants to be incentivized to participate, such a 
liberalized market must also be well-regulated with respect to quality of service, as well as 
the tariffs in the market, to ensure that company price-setting is competitive. Mining 
companies will only be incentivized to demand services from national telecommunications 
companies (under the Category 2 options) if they can ensure a lower cost and more reliable 
service than self-provision. 
 
In addition, in the context of open access, an important challenge faced by regulators is 
maintaining sufficient competition in the market as well as incentives for investment in new 
infrastructure. Mining companies that build the infrastructure may reduce future investment 
in additional capacity if their facilities are open to telecommunication service providers at 
low rates, particularly in remote areas where the economic rationale for building additional 
infrastructure is weak. However, if access prices are too high, telecommunications service 
providers either will not enter the market or will choose to install their own networks, 
resulting in inefficient duplication of infrastructure.  In this case, the government should 
implement a regime where other companies seeking to access the infrastructure have access 
on reasonable terms. A solution is often a light-touch regulatory solution letting the parties 
negotiate first, with the regulator stepping in only in case of disagreement. 
 
The regulator must also manage risks, monitor contractual obligations with 
telecommunications companies and effectively regulate access. It should be noted that the 
most appropriate regulatory system depends on the institutional context and the reforms being 
undertaken. It may be that an independent regulator is not essential to the reform process. If 
the institutional capacity of a country is limited, it could instead outsource regulatory 
functions to a third party or expert panel.
108
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Licensing and Spectrum Management: Efficient, clear, affordable and flexible licensing 
processes are important to allow, and to incentivize, mining companies to expand their ICT 
services, which are already outside of the scope of their main activities. The categorization of 
licenses can impact incentives significantly. Traditional licensing has typically required 
different and separate licenses for different technologies as well as for different types of 
services.  To increase efficiency and incentives for companies, governments are increasingly 
allowing flexible use, particularly through technical and service rules by adopting technology 
and service neutrality. 
109
 In order to increase flexibility in the licensing process, regulators 
have also begun to adopt even more unified frameworks to reduce the number of 
authorizations needed to carry out a number of activities (mobile phones, internet, 
broadcasting, etc.). Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, are some 
of the countries that have already implemented technology- and service-neutral licensing 
frameworks.
110
  If it becomes clear that licensing is a barrier that reduces the potential to 
leverage the use of mining operations’ ICT infrastructure, regulatory agencies may consider a 
license exemption in certain cases. 
 
In addition to adopting licenses that increase flexibility of the technology and service use, it is 
also important to adopt licensing processes that maximize the use of spectrum. The spectrum 
extends from low frequencies used for radio communication, to high-frequency, short 
wavelength gamma radiation used for very high technology science.  
 
New technologies enable multiple services to be provided using the same spectrum, which 
increases the need of regulators allocating spectrum rights more efficiently. To facilitate 
involvement of mining companies in the ICT sector, there must be a system of equitable 
access to spectrum for telecommunication carriers and industry. 
 
An illustration of the problem comes from Australia, in the Pilbara region, where the 
emergence of 4G technologies has led to a growth in demand for access to the 1800MHz 
spectrum band in remote areas. For mining operations, 1800MHz spectrum band is 
increasingly being used to support safety and operational systems on mine sites and is 
expected to increase to support communications systems and automated equipment 
technologies. So far, however, access to this appropriate spectrum has not been readily 
available to non-telecommunication carrier entities in the Pilbara region.
111
  
 
b. Encouraging and Regulating Shared Access to Mine Infrastructure 
Shared access to mine - related infrastructure underpins the Category 1b and Category 2b 
options set out under Step 2. This sub-section explores conditions that would be conducive to 
shared infrastructure access in the ICT context.  
 
Infrastructure sharing aims to extend networks to areas where service provision is 
commercially viable if several operators share the costs of infrastructure. As mentioned under 
Step 2, there is scope for sharing ICT infrastructure within the sector (between mines’ own 
infrastructure and telecommunications companies), as well as across sectors, particularly 
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those infrastructure sectors which are serving the mines (e.g. power utilities, railways, 
pipelines). However, in order to facilitate synergies across these sectors, a clear model for 
infrastructure sharing is necessary. This will enable services to be made available in a 
timelier and more cost effective way, and to manage and reduce the risk undertaken by 
investors. In addition, while mining companies could be contractually obliged under their 
concession agreements to enter into ICT infrastructure sharing arrangements, there are a 
number of ways in which government could otherwise incentivize them do so.   
 
The following principles might apply when thinking about facilitating shared access to 
infrastructure in the ICT context
112
  
 
i. Efficient use of resources 
Towers, ducts and rights of way can be shared for installations that serve a similar purpose, 
allowing for optimal use. Regulators could increase incentives for additional investment in 
infrastructure by making such resources and rights of way readily available, especially in 
public property. They might take measures such as limiting the fees charged and simplifying 
the legal process involved. 
 
The coordination of resources in this way can avoid duplication and wastage of capital 
expenditure. For example, several uncoordinated national broadband fiber optic networks are 
under construction in Zambia: one is being developed by the fixed telecommunications 
operator ZAMTEL, while separate networks are being built by the country’s power utility 
ZESCO and the Copperbelt Energy Company. Neither the government nor the 
telecommunications regulator has required coordination between them.
113
 Similarly in 
Zimbabwe, the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (Potraz), has been 
criticized for not enforcing infrastructure sharing regulations
114
 which resulted in duplicated 
work and high prices. On the contrary, Liberia is requiring co-location in its 
telecommunications law. 
 
Example from Liberia 
 
41. Co-location
115
  
 “(1) If not otherwise addressed in interconnection or access terms determined pursuant to  
Sections 34 to 38, and subject to any regulation, rule or order issued by the LTA, service 
providers with existing telecommunications network facilities shall allow other service 
providers to co-locate their telecommunications network facilities on those existing facilities, 
including central office premises and other equipment locations, land and roof tops, mast 
sites, towers, conduits, poles and underground facilities, where such co-location is technically 
and economically feasible and where no significant additional construction work is required.  
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(2) The party requesting co-location shall compensate the party required to provide co-
location for such an amount as the parties may agree or, where the parties are unable to agree, 
as may be determined by the LTA. 
 
(3) Where the parties are unable to agree on the terms and conditions of co-location, either or 
both of the parties may submit the matter for dispute resolution pursuant to Section 73. " 
 
ii. Access to Passive Infrastructure 
It is possible for regulators to instate formal rights which allow carriers the right to access to 
passive infrastructure that are owned by a non-carrier, i.e. players such as public utilities 
companies, that provide passive network elements but which do not compete for end users.
116
  
In this sense, if a mining company, or the owner of the mining railroad is not a licensed 
carrier, then a carrier may use their infrastructure to add optical fiber at a lower cost. This 
might make the realization of synergies between the mining companies and service providers 
more straightforward.  
 
Example from Australia: In Australia, the government enacted legislation (Part 20A of the 
Telecommunication Act) enabling carriers looking to install optical fiber to seek access to 
passive infrastructure which is owned by a non-carrier.  Where non-carrier companies are 
developing fiber optic networks as part of their development, they must now give the carrier 
access to the facility if this is requested. As a result, if a mining company is not a licensed 
carrier, then a carrier may use its infrastructure to add optical fibers at a lower cost. Access to 
the infrastructure is negotiated between parties involved, but if they cannot agree then an 
arbitrator, such as the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, is appointed to 
determine the conditions.
117 
 
 
Many developing countries have enacted laws that address infrastructure sharing, but they 
often fail to yield the expected results as neither the telecom operator nor the regulator has 
legal authority to enforce these shared use laws. Similar to the obligation for co-location in 
Liberia, the obligation for infrastructure sharing will often only be enforced if it is technically 
and economically feasible without significant additional construction work. 
 
In Mozambique, however, the National Regulator, INCM has recently issued a proposal for 
“Regulations on the Installation of Telecommunications Infrastructure in Building and Public 
Works,” that sets out detailed provisions for the rights of way on other infrastructure, 
including railroads. The level of clarity of the obligations of the parties and of the regulator, 
as well as of the conditions for access and denial access should enhance the enforceability of 
such regulations (see box below). 
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In addition to a regulatory framework mandating shared access, governments could also offer 
financial incentives. Many countries have a Universal Access and Service Fund (UASF) to 
provide financial incentives to operators to close the access gap.  Infrastructure sharing could 
be made a pre-requisite for receiving UASF for mining companies building infrastructure in 
new areas. 
 
iii. Price setting mechanism and dispute resolution mechanisms 
It is important that implementation of shared ICT infrastructure takes into account the 
necessity of protecting the value of existing investment in infrastructure and services. 
However, it is important that price, terms and conditions of access do not prevent the 
implementation of sharing.
119
  In that context, regulators should also have in place the 
necessary enforcement tools and their associated dispute resolution mechanisms to ensure 
compliance with infrastructure sharing regulations. 
 
iv. Transparency and establishing an infrastructure sharing one-stop-shop 
Transparent processes will be a key element in facilitating infrastructure sharing; market 
players need to know what is available for sharing under clearly established terms and 
conditions to be able work on synergies and mutually beneficial arrangements. Regulators 
could require publication on websites of the details of existing as well as future infrastructure 
                                                 
118
 Source: Article 10 of the “Proposta de Regulamento sobre Instalação de Infra-Estruturas de 
Telecomunicações em Edificios e Projectos de Obras Publicas,” Ministério dos Transportes e Comunicações 
(May2013), available at http://www.incm.gov.mz/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=88429f5e-129e-4ee0-a52a-
e52b0addabb9&groupId=10157. Translation is authors’ own.   
119
 Adapted from “Global Symposium for Regulators GSR 2008: Best Practice Guideline on Infrastructure 
Sharing,” International Telecommunication Union, op cit. 
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118
 
 
1. Operators and providers of telecommunications services have the right of access 
to infrastructures suitable for the accommodation of telecommunications 
networks owned or operated by the state, municipalities, the entities related to the 
areas of roads, bridges, railways, electricity, gas and petroleum products. 
2.  The access referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be provided on terms of 
equality, transparency and non-discrimination through tariffs that reflect costs. 
3. The procedures for obtaining the right of access should be timely, transparent and 
advertised, and cannot exceed the maximum period of 30 days after receipt of the 
demand for access. 
The following nine Articles under this Chapter stipulate the prohibition of exclusive use 
of public infrastructure, the conditions for the denial of access to public infrastructure, 
the procedures in the event of denied access, the obligations of the entities owning or 
managing public infrastructure, the fees for access to and use of public infrastructure, the 
procedures and conditions for access and use of public infrastructure, the details of the 
request for access to public infrastructure, the conditions of use of public infrastructure 
and co-location.  
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installations available for sharing by mining companies and other service providers, such as 
“the availability of space in existing ducts, planned deployment or upgrading works and 
interconnection.”120   
 
For instance, in the proposed regulation on the installation of ICT infrastructure on buildings 
and public works in Mozambique, the infrastructure owner is required to inform the 
Regulatory Authority on infrastructure suitable for shared use, to prepare the registration with 
geo-referenced information infrastructure suitable for shared use, develop and publish 
procedures and conditions for access and use of such infrastructure, and respond to requests 
for information on - access to these infrastructures.
121
  
 
Transparency could be facilitated by the creation of a one-stop-shop institution for 
infrastructure sharing to promote the coordination of civil works between 
telecommunications companies, as well as between telecommunications companies and 
utilities/mining-related construction companies.
122
 For example, Sierra Leone and Liberia are 
currently seeing the development of their mining railroads as well as planning the laying of 
their fiber optic cable around the country, suggesting that the government could play a 
valuable role in coordinating possible sharing of civil works necessary to build both types of 
infrastructure. Brazil is currently discussing a new telecommunication sector policy that will 
require from railway concessionaires to construct fiber optic cables along their rail 
network.
123
 In countries with strong local governance systems, local authorities could play a 
role in coordinating infrastructure sharing in their regions. 
 
v. Setting the basis for cross border infrastructure sharing 
With the possibilities for cross-border mining transport routes and regional power lines, 
cross-border infrastructure sharing in the ICT context could also be an imminent reality. In 
order to prepare for this, regulators might look to ensure an appropriate level of regional 
harmonization. Regional organizations have an important role in ensuring that best practice 
regulatory policies on sharing are widely spread, since a national regulator alone would not 
be able to resolve significant cross-border issues. The Southern African Power Pool, for 
example, is now requiring that new power lines include optical ground wire that has the 
additional use of providing telecommunications services.
124
 
 
                                                 
120
 Ibid 
121
 Article 14 of the “Proposta de Regulamento sobre Instalação de Infra-Estruturas de Telecomunicações em 
Edificios e Projectos de Obras Publicas,” Ministério dos Transportes e Comunicações (May2013), available at 
http://www.incm.gov.mz/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=88429f5e-129e-4ee0-a52a-
e52b0addabb9&groupId=10157. Translation is authors’ own.   
122
 Adapted from “Global Symposium for Regulators GSR 2008: Best Practice Guideline on Infrastructure 
Sharing,” International Telecommunication Union, op cit. 
123
 Toledano, Roorda, “Leveraging mining demand and investment in ICT for broader needs,” op.cit. 
124
 Ibid. 
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Step 4: Negotiating points 
This section considers points that may be raised during the negotiation of collaborative mine-ICT arrangements between the government, mining 
companies and telecommunications companies. The list is not exhaustive, but sets out some initial questions to consider. 
Situations Categories  Negotiating Points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mines build 
their own 
infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Telecommunications company adds capacity 
to mine infrastructure to serve the 
communities 
 
 In the absence of open-access, or a co-location framework, will the mine 
give access to its infrastructure voluntarily?  If not, there will be a need for 
a contractual obligation. 
 What are the conditions of infrastructure access? These include price and 
non-price factors, such as the length of the access agreement.  
 How will access to mine infrastructure be allocated? Competitive 
bidding/auction by regulator? Negotiation with mining company? 
 What are the rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect to 
maintenance of infrastructure? 
 What provisions can be made for when the mine ceases operations? 
 What are the dispute resolutions mechanisms that will be used in the event 
of a disagreement? 
 
 
 
 
 
Mines build/facilitate additional 
telecommunications capacity and lease it to 
telecommunication companies 
 
 
 Is this to be a contractual obligation of the mining company as part of its 
concession agreement? In the case where the mine does not see a 
commercial opportunity, there might be a need for a legal requirement. 
 How will additional capacity be allocated? Competitive bidding/auction by 
regulator? Negotiation with mining company? 
 On what terms will the capacity be leased? Terms should be reasonable to 
attract companies, but also not so low as to discourage mine from future 
investment in additional capacity. 
 Are there financial incentives available to the mining company to 
encourage building of additional capacity? 
o E.g. UASF contributions for mining companies building additional 
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capacity in new areas, tax breaks, subsidies. 
 
 What provisions can be made for when the mine ceases operations? 
 What are the dispute resolution mechanisms that will be used in the event 
of a disagreement? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mines do not 
build 
infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mines as an anchor demand for 
telecommunications companies 
 
 
 What are the responsibilities and obligations of each party under the 
agreement? 
 What are the key terms of the offtake agreements e.g. the amount of 
services being provided to the mining company, length of agreement, price 
to be charged? 
 If the mine is sharing in the capital cost, on which basis will each party 
contribute? 
 Is the mine offtake a sufficient anchor demand? If not, is it necessary for 
measures to be taken by government to create an additional anchor 
demand? 
 Do additional financial incentives need to be provided to the 
telecommunications company e.g. UASF contributions? 
 In the event of service going down, does the mine get priority access? 
 What provisions can be made for when the mine ceases operations?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Construction/utility companies  build 
required infrastructure to serve mines (e.g.: 
power, pipeline and railways) and add 
telecommunication capacity at a lower cost 
 
 Which parties will be involved? This will depend on the resources and 
rights of way to be used by the telecommunications company (public vs. 
private property)? In case of no access to passive infrastructure regulations 
– can it be a contractual requirement? 
 If multiple telecommunications companies are looking for access to the 
infrastructure, how will rights be allocated? Competitive bidding/auction 
by regulator? Negotiation with mining company? 
 Under what terms will access to infrastructure be granted? 
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  What are the rights and responsibilities of the parties with respect to 
maintenance of infrastructure?  
 In the event that the original infrastructure is damaged or negatively 
affected, how will this be compensated?  
 What are the dispute resolution mechanisms that will be used in the event 
of a disagreement? 
 
 
 
 
Government, telecommunication  and 
mining companies coordinate efforts and 
investments 
 
 
 Which parties will be involved? 
 What are the responsibilities and obligations of each party under the 
agreement? 
 What are the key terms of offtake agreements e.g. the amount of services 
being provided to the mining company, length of agreement, price to be 
charged? 
 If the mine is sharing in the capital cost, on which will each party 
contribute? 
 Is the mine’s offtake a sufficient anchor demand? If not, is it necessary for 
measures to be taken by government to create an additional anchor 
demand? 
 In the event of restriction of services, does the mine get priority access? 
 What provisions can be made for when the mine ceases operations? 
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About the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), a joint center of Columbia Law School and 
the Earth Institute at Columbia University, is a leading applied research center and forum for the 
study, practice and discussion of sustainable international investment.  Our mission is to develop and 
disseminate practical approaches and solutions to maximize the impact of international investment 
for sustainable development.  The CCSI’s premise is that responsible investment leads to benefits for 
both investors and the residents of host countries.  Through research, advisory projects, multi-
stakeholder dialogue and educational programs, the CCSI focuses on constructing and implementing 
a holistic investment framework that promotes sustainable development and the mutual trust needed 
for long-term investments, that can be practically adopted by governments, companies and civil 
society 
 
About the Natural Resource Charter 
The Natural Resource Charter is a manual of best practice aimed at governments and citizens of 
resource rich countries. It provides practical policy advice to support decision-making that can best 
harness the economic potential of resource extraction, including leveraging resource-related 
infrastructure for sustainable development.  
 
The Natural Resource Charter is delighted to support this project as it seeks to address an identified 
gap in knowledge and good practice principles around shared-use infrastructure. A key pillar of the 
Natural Resource Charter is helping countries leverage investments associated with resource 
extraction to benefit the wider economy and raise the welfare of citizens. The development of this 
framework by CCSI is an important step towards this goal. Lessons from the survey of worldwide 
experience will help inform Charter recommendations on this topic as well as the design of the 
Charter's country benchmarking tool, which is now being deployed in various resource rich countries. 
 
About the Sustainable Development Solutions Network 
The Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) mobilizes scientific and technical expertise 
from academia, civil society, and the private sector in support of sustainable development problem 
solving at local, national, and global scales. This Solutions Network accelerates joint learning and 
helps to overcome the compartmentalization of technical and policy work by promoting integrated 
approaches to the interconnected economic, social, and environmental challenges confronting the 
world. The SDSN provides expert advice and support to the various international processes working 
on the post-2015 development agenda; identifies, vets, and promotes solutions that accelerate 
progress towards sustainable development; and develops and disseminates online education material 
for sustainable development 
 
The Network is structured around thematic groups of global experts that work to identify common 
solutions and highlight best practices. Thematic Group 10 is on the Good Governance of Extractive 
and Land Resources. 
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Background 
 
To be beneficial for a country’s development, non-renewable resource extraction should be 
leveraged to build infrastructure that will support sustainable and inclusive growth. This is 
especially critical for countries facing an infrastructure-funding gap (in Africa alone there is 
an estimated annual infrastructure funding gap of US$31 billion according to the World 
Bank’s Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic.) While this can be achieved by capitalizing 
on resource taxation potential and reinvesting the tax revenues in public infrastructure, it can 
also be accomplished by requiring shared use of the infrastructure built by/for the mining 
sector to expand infrastructure coverage and access. However, the potential for leveraging 
mining-related infrastructure for broader development is often not realized.  
 
Mining companies have historically adopted an enclave approach to infrastructure 
development, providing their own power and transportation facilities to meet their “pit-to-
port” infrastructure needs. Major investments in physical infrastructure are also generally 
uncoordinated with national infrastructure development plans. Hence, opportunities are 
missed for promoting shared use of the infrastructure and taking advantage of potential 
synergies.  
 
In 2013, CCSI was granted an project from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade to develop an economically, legally and operationally rational framework to enable 
shared use of mining-related infrastructure, including rail, ports, power, water, internet and 
telecommunications. The framework builds on a worldwide survey of regulatory, commercial 
and operating models of shared use of rail, port and power infrastructure previously 
conducted by CCSI. It has been obtained by distilling best practice principles from 
infrastructure developments around the world, guided by expert opinion. It has most recently 
also been refined through in-depth case studies in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique, 
although its principles aim to be of general relevance to all resource rich African countries. 
The framework aims at providing guidance to policy makers on how to approach the question 
of shared use, highlighting the operational models that are necessary for implementation, the 
key-success factors, the enabling conditions and how to ultimately better coordinate major 
investments in physical infrastructure by privately-owned natural resource concessionaires 
with national infrastructure development plans.  The framework will also equip policy makers 
with a set of questions that should help conduct the negotiations on shared use with 
companies. The ultimate goal of the framework is to include shared infrastructure use as part 
of the planning and negotiation stages of extractive industry investments  
 
This workshop is designed to get feedback on the framework from mining-related 
infrastructure experts from academia, companies, governments, and donor and to discuss 
ways on how it could be improved. 
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7:45am – 8:30am: Registration and breakfast 
 
8:30am – 8:45am: Opening remarks 
 
The opening remarks will introduce the framework and provide answers to the following questions: 
 What is the framework for and how will it be used?  
 What is the timeline to deliver the final product?  
 How is this going to change the way things have been done previously?  
 
8:45am – 9:15am: Keynote speaker – Jeffrey Sachs 
 
9:15am – 10:00am:  Building power and mining synergies  
 What are the different power sourcing arrangements for mining operations? 
 What are the pre-conditions to enable synergies? 
 What points need to be addressed at the negotiation table to enable such 
synergies? 
 
10:00am – 10:15am: Coffee Break 
 
10:15am – 11:15pm: Round-table discussion on the findings  
 
11:15pm – 11:45pm: Minimizing the water footprint of mining and increasing access to 
[potable] water supply for communities 
 What are the models for supplying excess/ treated/ potable water to 
communities? 
 Are there operational roadblocks? 
 What type of regulations best minimize a mine’s water footprint and 
maximize its engagement with communities on water supply? 
 How do you ensure sustainability of water supply and treatment facilities 
after mine closure? 
 What should be the questions to ask at the negotiation table? 
 
11:45pm – 12:30pm: Round-table discussion on the findings 
 
12:30pm – 1:30pm: Lunch 
 
1:30pm – 2:30pm: Enabling shared use in rail and ports  
 What are the models best suited to promote multi-use and multi-party 
access to rail and port infrastructure?  
 Under which regulatory, commercial and operational conditions? 
 What is the scope for brownfield renegotiations to enable shared use? 
 What points need to be addressed at the negotiation table to enable shared 
use? 
 
2:30pm – 3:45pm: Round-table discussion on the findings 
 
3:45pm – 4:15pm: Coffee break 
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4:15pm – 4:45pm: What are the opportunities for increased ICT coverage in response to mining 
demand and investments? 
 Where should the efforts be focused? 
 What regulatory structures best promote mine-related investments in expanded 
ICT coverage in areas surrounding mining operations? 
 What should be the questions to ask at the negotiation table? 
 
4:45pm – 5:30pm: Round-table discussion on the findings 
 
5:30pm – 5:45pm: Closing Remarks
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